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ABSTRACT
Passenger behavior is the fundamental factor driving air transportation market reactions
to the managerial decisions of airlines; therefore, it is important to understand passenger
path choice process, and to develop a valid model to represent it. In this thesis, passenger
disutilities are used to indicate passengers' sensitivity to alternative path options.
Accordingly, passenger disutilities have a big impact on airline revenue performances,
depending on an airline's revenue management methods and the path options it provides.
As an attempt to understand and represent passenger disutilities with an analytical model,
this thesis describes the procedure for modeling passenger disutilities based on survey
answers from airline experts.
Modeling passenger disutilities assumes that they are function of market distances and
that they take the form of a distribution. In this thesis, we assume that the passenger
disutilities fit a linear function of market index fares in the form of Gaussian distribution
for every market. In order to determine appropriate parameters for the model, the survey
results obtained from airline experts are used. The coefficients of three disutility
functions indicate that path quality and replanning disutilities have greater influence on
passenger choice than unfavorite airline disutility does.
The Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator is used to test the impact of passenger
disutilities on a hypothetical 42-city, hub-and-spoke network. With all disutility functions
implemented, the simulation results suggest that the role of airline revenue managements
become more important with passenger preference for attractive paths. Also, the relative
benefits of Origin-Destination revenue management methods as supposed to Fare Class
Yield Management method are higher when passenger disutilities are considered. Among
the three disutility components modeled for this thesis, the replanning disutility
predominantly drives market response in our hypothetical network.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1. Passenger Disutilities in Airline Revenue Management
In the real world, the users of commercial air transportation service have a choice of one
or more available flight itineraries (or "paths") serving the desired markets. Depending
on individual characteristics, there can be various reasons for a path preference, such as a
preference for an airline, for a certain schedule, and so forth. Also, each individual has a
different degree of path preference. These path preferences strongly influence the
passenger behavior within the air transportation system.
Airline revenue management is basically a repeated process of optimizing booking limits
by fare class based on the forecast of expected demand. Modeling and forecasting
demand for air transportation service greatly depends on how passenger behaviors are
represented. Accordingly, airline revenue management, which is a way of maximizing
passenger revenue through seat inventory control, is influenced by the passenger behavior
patterns in path choice, hence it is important to have a reasonable understanding of
passenger choice for effective revenue management.
It is true that passenger path preferences are subjective; however, it is possible to
represent some of the most common factors in passenger choice as mathematical models.
In this thesis, we take four of the major components influencing passengers' path choice
into consideration - fare class restrictions, carrier preference, the number of
stops/connections in a path, and schedule. By assigning "disutility costs", which are
perceived inconvenience costs of traveling on a path that is relatively unattractive to
passengers, we can measure the total inconvenience of available paths within passengers'
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choice sets. Along with the nominal (fare) costs of the path, this inconvenience cost
serves as a rationale for modeling passengers' path choice.
In the first part of this thesis, we concentrate our efforts on building the passenger
disutility model. Among the four disutility components previously discussed, estimating
the latter three disutilities - carrier preference, number of stops/connects in a path, and
schedule - is the objective. The disutility cost for the path provided by carriers other than
a passenger's preferred carrier is called the "unfavorite airline" disutility cost, the
disutility cost assigned to a connecting path is the "path quality" disutility cost, and the
disutility cost assigned to a path that is outside the passenger's initial decision window' is
called the "replanning" disutility cost. These three disutility costs are assumed to be a
function of market index fares2 and are in the form of assumed probabilistic distributions
reflecting the stochastic nature of demand.
Once these disutility cost functions are defmed and estimated, we can test the impact of
passenger disutilities on various revenue management models through simulation. The
computational tool used for this purpose is the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator
(PODS).3 PODS takes disutility functions and revenue management schemes as input to
simulate a network of origin-destination markets for multiple airlines competing within
the network. The results from the simulation are presented in the latter part of this thesis.
1.2. Objective of Thesis
The major goal of this thesis is to develop a model representing passenger disutilities for
the three disutility components previously discussed. A survey of airline experts is
conducted in order to obtain realistic disutility function parameters. The passenger
'Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (1993). See Section 2.3.3 for the definition of a decision window.
2 Market index fares indicate the overall fare level of the market for each passenger type. In the scope of
this thesis, Q class fare is used as a leisure passenger market index fare, and 2.5*Q class fare is used as a
business passenger market index fare. Market index fares are also referred to as market basefares, as
described in Section 4.1.3.
3 See Section 3.3 for details.
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disutility model is an attempt to understand passenger behavior pattern. With the
passenger disutility model, airlines can get a better understanding of passengers' decision
process and its impact on performances their revenue management sectors.
Six representative revenue management methods are tested in this thesis to understand
the impact of passenger disutilities on different revenue management schemes: Fare Class
Yield Management vs. Origin-Destination Revenue Management, or Expected Marginal
Seat Revenue based methods vs. network bid price methods.4
1.3. Structure of Thesis
Chapter 2 explains the basic concept of passenger disutilities before going into
mathematical detail in later chapters. The definition of passenger disutilities and disutility
costs is explained, as well as its components of interest to us: unfavorite airline disutility,
path quality disutility, and replanning disutility. Also in Chapter 2, we walk through some
of the existing literature with approaches to demand modeling that are not included in this
thesis. The two major measures of path attractiveness that are examined in this chapter
are the utility concept used in the logit model5 and quality of service index6.
Chapter 3 is an overview of airline revenue management methods and the simulation tool
of this thesis, PODS. A brief explanation of airline revenue management is followed by
explanation of various revenue management methods and their implications. Descriptions
for the EMSRb model with a FCYM approach and five other Origin-Destination revenue
management methods (Greedy Virtual Nesting, Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting,
Network Bid Price, and Prorated Bid Price) are presented in this chapter. An introduction
to PODS, its architecture, and its input/output parameters, along with the PODS
simulation environment, is included in this chapter as well.
4 For detailed explanation about revenue management methods and their implications, see Section 3.1 and
3.2
s See Section 2.4.1
6 See Section 2.4.2
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Chapter 4 describes the modeling procedure for passenger disutility functions. First, we
look into how PODS models disutilities, as well as the PODS passenger assignment
model with examples of disutility costs for each component for business and leisure
passengers. In Section 4.2, the survey conducted for the purpose of estimating disutility
function coefficients is presented along with the responses. The mathematical process to
extract the disutility parameters from these responses is illustrated afterwards.
Chapter 5 presents the basic results of simulation with all disutility functions
implemented in the PODS simulation. Revenue gains from using O-D revenue
management methods, as well as load factors and fare mix, are compared to the base
case, which does not incorporate passenger disutilities as a factor in its passenger choice
model.
In Chapter 6, sensitivity analysis for each of the three disutility components modeled in
this thesis is presented. We examine the impacts of each disutility component separately
in simulations, implementing one of the three components at a time. Detailed analyses of
results, as well as the impacts of each component are discussed in this chapter.
In Chapter 7, this thesis concludes with a summary of modeling passenger disutilities and
findings from the disutility simulations. At the very end of this chapter, we address some
of the issues for future research directions involving passenger disutility models.
13
Chapter 2 Passenger Disutilities
In the real world, air transportation passengers are constantly forced to make a choice
from a wide range of alternate options of paths offered in a desired market, which we
label as "path options". In making those decisions, each passenger has his/her own
criteria for measuring attractiveness or unattractiveness of each path option. Disutilities
represent the unattractiveness of the path, categorized by various components. The
purpose of this chapter is to walk through the basic concepts of passenger disutilities
before going in to mathematical details in Chapter 4.
Section 2.1 introduces the concept of passenger disutilities, followed by an introduction
to how disutilities can be modeled, in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 introduces three major
disutilities utilized in the PODS simulation; path quality disutility, replanning disutility,
and unfavorite airline disutility. Finally Section 2.4 reviews and compares the passenger
disutility concept with related literature, followed by Section 2.5, which summarizes this
chapter.
2.1. Basic Concept of Passenger Disutilities and Disutility
Costs
Passenger disutilities represent the unattractiveness of a path option to a passenger. By
introducing the concept of passenger disutilities, we can quantify the unattractiveness of
specific passenger choice options. Once the passenger disutilities are modeled and
measured, it becomes possible to simulate a random passenger's behavior and perform a
mathematical calculation to map the decision process into a computational simulation
tool. Moreover, in order to capture the stochastic property of passenger behaviors, we
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assume that the passenger disutilities take a form of a probability distribution (namely,
Gaussian distribution in this case) rather than a deterministic representation of passenger
behavior.
There exist variety of reasons that a flight path option is attractive or unattractive to a
passenger. Among various reasons, we can pick out the most important rationales that are
common to most passengers. The Passenger Origination Destination Simulator, which
serves as the computational simulation tool for disutility experiments presented later in
this thesis (see Section 3.3 for detailed explanation), classifies passenger disutilities into
four categories: restriction disutilities, path quality disutilities, replanning disutilities, and
unfavorite airline disutilities7 . Restriction disutilities represent the perceived
unattractiveness of restrictions associated with a fare product. Path quality disutilities
measure the unattractiveness of a connecting or stopover path relative to nonstop path.
Replanning disutility is programmed to penalize the path options that are outside of
passenger's decision window8 . Unfavorite airline disutility, as its name suggests, says
that the path option of an airline other than one's preferred airline is less attractive that a
path option on one's preferred airline.
These four disutilities can be weighted by the relative importance of each category in
passenger's decision. Then these disutilities can be quantified in terms of dollar costs, for
a fair comparison with nominal fares of each path itinerary. This value is called the
disutility cost, comparable to the out-of-pocket dollar cost of the path option.
For example, a passenger can choose between two fare products, let's say, $250 B class
with Saturday night stay restriction and $400 Y class with no restrictions. Depending on
how this certain passenger weighs the Saturday night stay restriction, this passenger will
make a decision between the two options. If a passenger, let's say passenger 1, is willing
to pay no more than $100 dollars more to book on a fare class without the Saturday night
stay restriction, the Y class is less attractive than B class with the restriction (See Table
7 Wilson [14]
8 See Section 2.3.3 for definition of decision window
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2.1). On the other hand, there can be another passenger, passenger 2, who is very
reluctant to sleep over a Saturday night in the destination. Then this passenger will be
willing to pay more than what passenger 1 would pay to fly in a Y class with no
restrictions, let's say $200. In this case the disutility cost of Saturday night stay restriction
is $100 for passenger 1, and $200 for passenger 2. The total "perceived" cost of
passenger 1 for the fare class with Saturday night stay is then $350 whereas the total
"perceived" cost of passenger 2 is $450. The total "perceived" cost is designated as "total
cost" in PODS, with more explanations on Section 2.2 and 4.1.4. Under the assumption
that both the passengers will make a rational decision, that is, choose a path option with
less total cost, passenger 1 will choose B class with $350 total cost, whereas passenger 2
will choose to book on a Y class with $400 total cost. Table 2-1 illustrates how the
disutility cost of Saturday night stay affects the path choice decision of each passenger.
Passenger 1 Passenger 2
Y Class Fare $400 $400
No Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $0 $0
Total Cost $400 $400
B Class Fare $250 $250
Saturday Night Stay Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $100 $200
Total Cost $350 $450
.|..l.i ii: Path 2 Path 1
Table 2-1 Total cost of path option 1 (with no restrictions) and 2 (with Saturday night stay
restriction), for passengers 1 and 2
This approach of modeling the passenger disutilities in a passenger choice model is an
opposite approach of the traditional approach of demand modeling, using "utility" as a
measure of path attractiveness. An overview of the traditional models and comparison
with the passenger disutility model is provided in Section 2.4.
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2.2. Disutility Modeling
Various attributes of individuals and travel paths can take part in the process of individual
decision-making. In this thesis we concentrate on representing attributes of travel paths
that are recognized as both important and objective. As for classification of individuals,
we use the conventional grouping of passengers into two categories, business passengers
and leisure passengers.
The four representative attributes of the path attractiveness, along with monetary costs of
the path itinerary, are added into a single property for a reasonable comparison between
alternate path options, representing actual passenger's decision process. This was defined
earlier in Section 2.1 as the total cost. Once the total cost is defined the decision rule of a
rational passenger becomes simple: choose the path with least total cost.
The methodology that Chapter 4 of this thesis focuses on is scaling the disutility costs of
four attributes in a reasonable way. The estimates in dollar costs of each disutility
categories (unfavorite airline, path quality, replanning and restrictions) can be
approximated using data gathered from a survey conducted of potential users or airline
experts. The survey that was performed for this purpose is explained more in detail in
Section 4.2. The estimates of each disutility cost will be in a form of a distribution, which
we can approximate as a Gaussian distribution. From the survey responses the average
and standard deviation of the distribution are extracted, to represent an individual
passenger's perceived cost of each disutility. This Gaussian distribution with mean and
standard deviation derived from the survey can be thought as a representative distribution
for the cost of each disutility component, hence can be used as an input to the total cost
calculation.
Once each disutility is approximated into a distribution measured as dollar costs, the total
cost is the sum of all disutility costs with the nominal fare. This process is done for every
17
passenger for his/her own choice of path. Disutility cost distributions are assumed to be
independent for both leisure and business passengers. With the total cost calculated for
each passenger we can now approximate passengers' path choice process with a
mathematical model; choosing least total cost path.
2.3. Disutility Components
The disutility components that are of our interest are fare class restriction disutilities,
unfavorite airline disutilities, path quality disutilities, and replanning disutilities. Among
these four disutilities this thesis concentrates on defining and modeling the latter three
components. This section explains the definitions and implications of these three
disutility components.
2.3.1. Unfavorite Airline Disutility
A person who is willing to travel via air has a choice among paths offered by various
carriers. When all else is equal, the customer is likely to have a tendency to choose one
carrier over other carriers. There can be many reason for one's inclination toward an
airline, such as a membership of frequent flyer program, corporate association, perception
of general service, safety, reliability, etc. The tendency to favor one airline over others is
"airline preference" and we name this preferred airline as "favorite airline". In the same
sense all other airlines are called "unfavorite" airlines.
For the paths offered by carriers other than the favorite airline of a passenger, we add the
unfavorite airline disutility cost to the total cost of the path in order to reflect the
inconvenience cost of traveling with an unfavorite airline. Depending on the total cost, a
rational passenger will make a path choice to fly on a path with the least total cost.
For example, let's assume two passengers, both with a choice between Y class of a
favorite airline and B class of an unfavorite airline. Furthermore let's apply the same
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example as in Section 2.2; with a Y class fare of $400 and a B class fare of $250, and for
both passengers a B class restriction disutility cost of $100. Without an airline preference,
the rational choice for both passengers would be path 2 with B class, which has total cost
of $350 as we observed in Table 2-1. Now if we assume that path 2 is offered by an
unfavorite airline, the total cost increases for path 2 with additional unfavorite airline
disutility cost. Let's say that passenger I is less sensitive to airline preference, with
unfavorite airline disutility cost of $25. On the other hand, let's assume that passenger 2
is a loyal customer of the "favorite" airline (possibly a member of the frequent flyer
program of that airline), and in consequence is willing to pay higher than passenger 1 to
fly on a favorite airline, for example, $75. Then the total cost of path 2 for passenger 1 is
$375, still less than path 1, leading this passenger to choose path 2 over path 1. However,
passenger 2 with higher unfavorite airline disutility cost now ends up with $425 of total
cost for path 2, making this option less attractive than Y class of favorite airline. Table 2-
2 illustrates this example, showing how unfavorite airline disutility cost affects a
passenger's decision of path choice.
Passenger 1 Passenger 2
Y Class Fare $400 $400
No Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $0 $0
Favorite Airline UFA Disutility Cost $0 $0
Total Cost $400 $400
B Class Fare $250 $250
Saturday Night Stay Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $100 $100
Unfavorite Airline UFA Disutility Cost $25 $75
Total Cost $375 $425
Table 2-2 Total cost of path option 1 (with favorite airline) and 2 (with unfavorite airline), for
passengers 1 and 2
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2.3.2. Path Quality Disutility
Path quality indicates how convenient the path options are for a passenger. Generally a
non-stop path is considered to have better path quality than a one-stop or a connecting
path. When a passenger's path option has a stopover or a connection, additional path
quality disutility cost is added to the total cost to convert the inconvenience the passenger
has to put up with into dollar costs. In Chapter 4 we introduce path quality index to
measure path quality in numbers. With path quality index, the path quality disutility cost
can be estimated to be a product of path quality index and unit path quality index
disutility cost. For further description of path quality index see Section 4.1.3.4.
We can continue with the example shown in Section 2.2 to illustrate how path quality
disutility plays a role in passenger's path choice. Assume two passengers with path
choice between Y class nonstop path and B class connecting path. The restriction
disutility cost for B class is assumed to be $100. If passenger 1 is a leisure passenger who
is relatively less sensitive to path quality, for example, with additional path quality
disutility for connecting path being only $25, the total cost of second path for this
passenger is $375 whereas the total cost for Y class nonstop path is $400. Hence
passenger 1 will choose the B class connecting path rather than Y class nonstop path. On
the other hand, passenger 2 is assumed to be more sensitive to path quality, willing to pay
$75 more for a nonstop path. In this case the total cost of the second path becomes $425,
making the connecting option less attractive for passenger 2. The detailed comparisons
for two passengers are illustrated in Table 2-3.
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Passenger 1 Passengetr 2
Y Class Fare $400 $400
No Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $0 $0
Nonstop Path Path Quality Disutility Cost $0 $0
Total Cost $400 $400
................ O
........... .. . .-.. *&M x n t
B Class Fare $250 $250
Saturday Night Stay Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $100 $100
Connecting Path Path Quality Disutility Cost $25 $75
Total Cost $375 $425
.i.....i....Pq liCi. ii. iiii Path 2 Path 1
Table 2-3 Total cost of path option 1 (nonstop path) and 2 (connecting path), for passengers 1 and 2
2.3.3. Replanning Disutility
When planning a trip (via air or other modes), a traveler implicitly or explicitly sets an
earliest possible departure time and latest arrival time for his/her travel. The time interval
between the possible earliest departure time and latest arrival time is called the
passenger's decision window. If there are no available path choices within one's decision
window, the passenger either has to cancel the trip (spill out) or replan the trip with path
options outside his/her decision window. Direct or indirect replanning of the trip exerts
an additional cost to passenger, and we can incorporate this inconvenience cost of
replanning into total cost of the path by defining replanning disutility cost. Replanning
disutility cost is added to the total cost of the path when the path is outside of one's
decision window, making replanned path less attractive to the passenger compared to the
path options within the decision window.
For example, let's continue with the example we have been using throughout this chapter.
We assume two passengers with same choice set; Y class path within the decision
window and B class path outside of the decision window. The restriction disutility for B
class is assumed to be $100 for both passengers. Now if we assume that passenger 1 is on
a personal trip being less time sensitive, hence assigning replanning disutility cost of $25,
the total cost for second path becomes $375, which is less than the total cost of the Y
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class path within the decision window. For passenger 2, who we assume is a business
passenger with less flexibility of schedule and with replanning disutility cost of $75, the
total cost of the replanned path (path option 2) becomes $425, making the replanned path
less attractive than first path option. Table 2-4 shows the process of deriving the total cost
for two passengers in our example.
Passenger 1 Passenger 2
Y Class Fare $400 $400
No Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $0 $0
Path within Decision Window Replanning Disutility Cost $0 $0
Total Cost $400 $400
B Class Fare $250 $250
Saturday Night Stay Restriction Restriction Disutility Cost $100 $100
Path outside Decision Window Replanning Disutility Cost $25 $75
Total Cost $375 $425
. IiN ... Path 2 Path 1
Table 2-4 Total cost of path option 1 (within decision window) and 2 (outside decision window), for
passengers 1 and 2
2.4. Literature Review
In this thesis we evaluate passenger's path choice by assigning disutility costs to each
path. There have been other approaches in attempting to measure attractiveness of choice
options for a rational passenger. In this section we examine the traditional passenger
choice modeling approaches and compare them with our disutility model. Especially this
section is focused on two of the most commonly used measures used in passenger
demand modeling in transportation passenger choices; utility and quality of service. The
well-known logit model? uses utility functions as a measure of passenger's path
preference. Others incorporate quality of service for the purpose of passenger choice
modeling.
9 For deeper understandings of logit model see Ben Akiva and Lerman [5] and/or Kanafani [10]
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2.4.1. Utility - The Logit Model
Utility is a measure of attractiveness of an alternative, expressed as a function of
attributes of the alternative. In the passenger choice model which uses the utility function
as a referring index of attractiveness, the objective of a decision maker is to maximize the
utility of a path. Logit model is a representative passenger choice model with utilities as a
measure of path attractiveness.
Among many works introducing the logit model, Kanafani [10] and Ben Akiva and
Lerman [5] give a good description of the logit model. The basic idea of logit model is to
use the systematic utility as a measure of passenger's path preference. The logit choice
model builds up from defining the probabilistic utility of each choice option. We
represent the deterministic element of the utility with Vin and random component with
E;n. Then the utility of path i in the choice set of passenger C, Ui,, can be expressed as
sum as the deterministic component and the random component (disturbance).
Uin =Vin +C in
Utility of path j for passenger n is also expressed in the same manner:
U.- =V., +E
For the case that the passenger has only two options, the logit model starts with an
assumption that E, = Ej, -Ei, is logistically distributed:
F(E ) = _ 9 , p>0,-00< E< 0
1+ e
f (1+e -" )2
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where p is a positive scale parameter. The logistic distribution approximates the normal
distribution quite well, while being analytically convenient. With the logical distribution
assumption, the choice probability for alternative i is given by:
P (i)=Pr(Uin>U! )
1
e Ai
eV" +peVln
In case of multinomial choices, the disturbances E;i are assumed to be (1) independently
distributed, (2) identically distributed, and (3) Gumbel-distributed with a location
parameter r7 and a scale parameter p>0. Then the multinomial logit model expresses the
probability of passenger n choosing alternative i as:
pV
P (i) =
jeiE C?
The systematic utility used in the logit model plays a similar role that disutility has in the
passenger choice model later presented in this thesis. The major difference is that utility
measures the attractiveness of an alternative, whereas disutility measures the
unattractiveness. The logit model assumes a logical (binomial choice) or Gumbel
(multinomial choice) distribution for analytical purpose, whereas our model assumes a
Gaussian distribution of disutilities.
2.4.2. Quality of Service Index (QSI)
Quality of service is another way of representing the perceived attractiveness of a path
choice. The quality of service can be expressed as a scalar function of various quality of
24
service variables, such as travel time, trip reliability, trip comfort, trip convenience, etc.
The quality of service has been an important variable in demand modeling of
transportation systems.
For more precise definition, Quality of Service Index was introduced to the area of
transportation demand modeling. Quality of Service Index, or Quantitative Share Index
(QSI), is an industry standard measuring the "attractiveness" of an itinerary relative to the
entire set of other itineraries (including competing airlines) in that marketl0 . QSI is a
function of various attributes of the path, such as number of stops, level of service, time
of departure, and etc. There is a QSI for each itinerary i in each market m for each airline
a denoted QSI7 . The sum of QSI' over all itineraries i in a market m over all airlines a
is equal to 1, for all markets. With all itineraries measured in terms of service quality,
QSI' becomes the probability of a passenger in market m choosing airline a, itinerary i.
QSI is another representation of an attractiveness of an alternative, along with utility.
However it is not represented in a distribution but as a deterministic value omitting
stochastic nature of demand, hence QSI has generally been used in macroscopic demand
modeling in transportation rather than individual passenger choice modeling.'1
2.5. Summary
In this chapter the basic concept of passenger disutilities was explained. Along with
itinerary fares, passenger disutility, which is a measure of path unattractiveness, is an
important factor that affects passenger's path choice. The four major components
consisting passenger disutility costs are restriction disutilities, unfavorite airline
disutilities, path quality disutilities, and replanning disutilities. Each of the components
10 Definition of QSI adapted from Kniker, Tom [11]. Original model for QSI was developed by the staff of
CAB for application in domestic-route proceedings, such as the investigation of Reno-Portland/Seattle
nonstop service, May 1970.
" QSI is used to estimate market shares, or to estimate demand for each itineraries for scheduling purposes.
See Etschmaier and Mathaisel [7] and Kniker [11] for example.
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are rated in dollar terms and added up with itinerary fare for each passenger to determine
which path would be most favorable for each passenger. The detailed procedure of
passenger choice is explained in Chapter 4, along with process of disutility modeling.
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Chapter 3 Overview of Airline Revenue Management
and PODS Simulation
Airline revenue management is a way of maximizing passenger revenue through the seat
inventory control. In this thesis, we consider six major revenue management methods
widely used in the airline industry, which are described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The
revenue management system decides whether to accept or deny passenger bookings,
based on their estimated revenue value to the airline. Since the passenger behavior has a
direct influence on the performance of the revenue management system, the passenger
disutilities modeled and tested throughout this thesis are expected to have a significant
influence on the performance of the different revenue management systems.
Revenue maximization through seat inventory control is comprised of three fundamental
process: 1) forecasting the expected passenger by fare class, 2) optimizing the booking
limits based on these demand forecasts, and 3) revising both forecasts and the booking
limits as actual bookings are accepted 2 . Where passenger disutilities play a major role is
in the first step. Booking history and forecasting are outputs of passenger behavior; hence
under the "rational passenger choice", that is, a passenger chooses to book a path option
with the least perceived cost, passenger disutility costs play an important role in the
passenger choice. The role of revenue management system is to adjust the protection
levels to maximize the total revenue.
In this chapter we will walk through the basic concepts of each revenue management
system before starting the discussion about impact of passenger disutilities on various
revenue management systems.
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12 Source: Belobaba [3]
As a computational simulation tool for the disutility experiments presented in later
chapters, the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS) developed by The Boeing
Company is used. Section 3.3 includes a brief description of PODS simulation and its
sub-models. Section 3.4 illustrates the base case network used for the simulation in this
thesis, followed by summary of the chapter in Section 3.5.
3.1. Airline Revenue Management - Fare Class Yield
Management (FCYM)
Airline seat inventory control, otherwise known as airline revenue management, is the
practice of managing the availability of seats to be sold at different fare levels to
passengers wishing to travel a particular itinerary. The simpler and most widely used
revenue management algorithms can be categorized into Fare Class Yield Management
algorithms. FCYM models control seat inventory on a flight leg basis, rather than a path
basis like some recently developed and tested models presented in Section 3.2. Generally
FCYM methods require simpler data collection and optimization then O-D revenue
management methods, hence currently are used by the majority of the airlines that
practice revenue management. However there have been voices in recent years that claim
that the leg based revenue management has been pushed to its extreme in terms of
revenue gains, and more airlines are now considering, planning or even starting to
implement O-D revenue management systems.
Under the FCYM approach, the availability of a seat for a given booking class is
calculated independently for each flight leg. Hence the availability of a seat for multiple-
leg itinerary is limited by the minimum booking limit of all legs included in that itinerary
for the same fare class. There are some obvious disadvantages of this approach due to the
limitations just described, which led to development of various O-D revenue management
methods described in Section 3.2. The most critical shortcoming of the leg-based FCYM
approach is that it does not distinguish between connecting passengers and local
passengers when they are in the same fare class, which can result in loss of potential
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revenues for over a network of connecting flights. Section 3.2 introduces some O-D
based revenue management methods developed to overcome the limitation of leg based
revenue management.
EMSR Model
The nested EMSR model for multiple fare classes was originally developed by
Belobaba . The model makes use of expected marginal revenue of incremental seats
made available to each fare class, determining booking limits for the classes for all fare
classes. The expected marginal revenue of an incremental seat is the expected value of
the revenue from selling that seat given the probability density function of the flight leg
demand forecast. Given the forecasted demand on a leg basis, the EMSRb algorithm sets
a booking limit for each fare class as to a point where the next fare class's fare is greater
than the expected marginal value of the last seat of the protecting fare class. With the
protection level for each fare class determined, EMSRb algorithm calculates the nested
protection level for each fare class to make sure that highest fare class always have seat
availability. For details see Belobaba [2].
This model is used for revenue management by many of the airlines in the world. There
still exist the same limitations in optimality of the EMSRb model applied to FCYM as
previously described. However the significance of the EMSRb model lies in the fact that
it is widely used, as well as the fact that it serves as a basis for some of the O-D methods
examined in Section 3.2.
3.2. Origin-Destination Revenue Management Methods
Several revenue management systems were developed to modify some of the limitations
that FCYM has. Where as FCYM is flight leg based revenue management method that
does not distinguish between local and connecting passengers with different revenue
13 See Belobaba [1] for original EMSR model, Belobaba [2] for nested EMSRb model.
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potential, there have been additional efforts to implement path based forecast and/or path
based optimization. Greedy Virtual Nesting (GVN) and Displacement Adjusted Virtual
Nesting (DAVN) use virtual classes instead of fare classes. Network Bid Price (Netbid)
and Prorated Bid Price (ProBP) method uses a bid price mechanism for O-D control.
Heuristic Bid Price Method (HBP) uses both virtual classes and bid price mechanism.
The following sections briefly go though the idea of each revenue management system.
For more thorough explanations see Williamson [13] and/or Lee [12].
3.2.1. Greedy Virtual Nesting (GVN)
The word "Virtual" of Greedy Virtual Nesting comes from the fact that this approach
uses "virtual" or hidden classes instead of published booking classes. The virtual classes
are defined throughout the whole network, based on the total fares of the itineraries for
every existing path. Hence the high fare long distance fares will be assigned to a higher
virtual class than the low fare short distance fares. By mapping virtual classes according
absolute fare values of the itinerary, GVN generally gives priorities to connecting
markets with higher revenue potential. Data collection, forecast, optimization and
availability control are all done on a per-virtual class, per-leg basis, with EMSRb
algorithm for seat inventory control booking limit optimization.
There also exist drawbacks for GVN. As suggested by the term "Greedy", GVN favors
connecting passengers to local passengers. Usually accepting a connecting passenger
over a local passenger brings in higher revenues. However when there is high demand for
both local legs, sometimes accepting two local passengers rather than a connecting
passenger generates more revenue. This is when GVN shows its weakness; by rejecting
two local passengers to accept a connecting passenger, GVN loses some of the revenue
potential.
For the standard simulator testing of this thesis, GVN does seat inventory control based
on 8 virtual classes with system-wide virtual boundaries. Table 3-1 shows the standard
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upper and lower boundary fare settings for virtual classes, for the hypothetical network
that we have developed.
Virtual Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Upper Boundary 1002.84 777.57 388.78 291.59 204.05 150.96 126.15 91.16
Lower Boundary 777.57 388.78 291.59 204.05 150.96 126.15 91.16 0.00
Table 3-1 Virtual class boundary fares
3.2.2. Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN)
The basic structure of DAVN is exactly the same as GVN. However, unlike GVN,
DAVN does not unconditionally favor connecting passengers over local passengers when
accepting a booking for a seat, but considers the possibility of dislocating a second local
passenger when accepting a connecting passenger. If the probability of both flight legs in
a connecting path being full is high, DAVN gives bigger penalties to connecting fares of
that path.
Given an O-D based demand forecast, DAVN solves a deterministic linear program to
optimize the entire connecting network and to generate shadow prices for each leg for
each departure. The shadow price can be translated as the revenue that airline is willing to
accept a booking on an additional seat in a given flight leg. After the shadow prices are
generated from the deterministic LP for each leg, the "pseudo fares" of each leg for
multi-leg paths are calculated as the nominal fare on minus the shadow price. For
example, if the connecting path is consisted of flight leg i and j, the pseudo fare (PF) for
local and connecting passengers for each leg can be expressed as follows:
Leg i: Local Passenger PFL' = Fare on leg i
Connecting Passenger PFc'= Fare on leg i - Shadow price on leg j
Leg j: Local Passenger PFLi = Fare on leg j
Connecting Passenger PFci = Fare on leg j - Shadow price on leg i
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In this case the shadow price is assumed to be the displacement cost for the connecting
fares, displacement cost meaning the potential revenue that the airline is losing by
accepting a connecting passenger. The pseudo fares of connecting paths and nominal
fares of local markets are then mapped into virtual classes for leg based seat inventory
control following the EMSRb algorithm.
The standard version of DAVN for the purpose of this thesis uses 8 virtual buckets with
initial boundaries defined as in Table 3-1. The virtual boundaries are initially defined the
same for all flight legs, are then re-defined at every timeframe14 specific for each leg.
After the first timeframe, standard DAVN is set to re-solve the LP at every timeframe,
calculating the new displacement costs and pseudo fares for leg based optimization at
every timeframe.
3.2.3. Network Bid Price (Netbid)
The Network Bid Price mechanism uses bid prices for seat inventory control instead of
booking limits. Netbid is a complete O-D revenue management algorithm; with O-D
based demand forecast and O-D based seat inventory control. The biggest difference of
Netbid compared to FCYM based revenue management methods introduced in this thesis
is that instead of using EMSRb algorithm to set booking limits, Netbid generates a bid
price to accept all bookings with fares greater than the bid price. Hence Netbid usually
appears to be more "open" to accepting bookings compared to EMSR methods with
strictly defined booking limits.
Netbid first solves a deterministic linear program to generate bid prices for each leg for
each departure, using ODF demand forecasts. The bid price for an itinerary is assumed to
be the sum of shadow prices of the legs traversed. Bookings with total itinerary fare
greater than the bid price are accepted, and bookings with fares lower than the bid price
are rejected. Until the network LP is re-optimized the bid price remains constant,
14 Checkpoint for optimization. See Section 3.3.1 for more explanation.
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therefore frequent update and reoptimization is crucial for Netbid to perform well.
Standard Netbid re-optimizes every 200 bookings on our hypothetical network,
approximating once-a-day revision of the airlines in the real world.
3.2.4. Heuristic Bid Price (HBP)
Heuristic Bid Price is also called Greedy Virtual Nesting with EMSR Heuristic Bid Price.
HBP was developed by Belobaba 5 . It is almost identical to GVN; the difference between
GVN and HBP is in optimization and availability control. HBP, like DAVN, takes
account of the fact that network revenue contribution of a connecting fare is actually less
than the whole itinerary fare of the connecting path. But instead of taking the network
optimization approach, HBP enables path-based control without using network
optimization, which is still a difficult option for many airlines.
HBP collects data at a leg/bucket basis while doing network based O-D control, unlike
Netbid with path-based forecasting. For local paths HBP uses standard EMSRb booking
limits on the leg; for connecting paths HBP uses a bid price method instead of EMSR
booking limits. Bid prices are the weighted sum of EMSR value of two legs consisting
the path, with one leg's EMSRb value weighted with the heuristic d-factor. For example,
for leg i in a simple two-leg case (leg i andj), the bid prices are calculated as follows:
Leg i: Local Passenger BPLi = EMSRci
Connecting Passenger BPci = EMSRci + d*EMSRcj
Only passengers with itinerary fares greater than the bid price are accepted. For a
connecting passenger, the itinerary fare must be greater than all bid prices of each leg
consisting the connecting path.
33
" Belobaba [4]
Like Netbid, HBP has no control over the number of bookings between recalculation of
bid price; hence frequent reoptimization is an important issue. The standard version of
HBP uses the same virtual classes as GVN with reoptimizing every 200 bookings on our
hypothetical network (just as Netbid). The heuristic d-factor is set to 0.25 for the
experiments for this thesis.
3.2.5. Prorated Bid Price (ProBP)
Finally, the most recent developed revenue management algorithm tested and used in
PODS is Prorated Bid Price (ProBP) method. This method was developed and examined
by Bratu16 . The basic concept of this method is to use a bid price method to determine
looking limits on a given flight. However, unlike other bid price methods, ProBP
determines the bid price for each leg used in each O-D path and divides the actual total
fare in between the connecting legs. The bid price used in this "prorating" is the EMSRc
value, which is the EMSR value of the last seat sold on a leg. With this "prorating" of the
fares ProBP is able to take the network structure and leg demand into account. For set of
legs traversed by an ODFj, L(j), the prorated fare of ODFj in leg k, PRF(jk), is defined
as follows:
> EMSRc (m) # 0 =>PRF(j,k)= EMSRc(k) x F.
meL, i EMSRc(m)
me Lj
> EMSRc (m)=0 => PRF(j,k)= F
meL, card(L)
where F is the original fare of ODFj and EMSRe(m) is the critical EMSR value of leg m.
The other issue worth noting here is the fact that EMSRb model used the full ODF fare
when computing EMSRC, therefore overestimating the critical EMSR value. Hence
ProBP introduces a convergence model to adjust this problem of overestimating the
EMSRc value; the model iterates until the difference between the calculated PRF value
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16 Bratu [6]
and the input PRF value for EMSRc calculation is below a certain criteria. This model
works extremely well, better than many other methods, as shown in simulation results
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presented by Bratu
The PODS standard version of ProBP reoptimizes every 200 bookings. ProBP repeats
until the EMSRc value converges with $10 range, with maximum number of iteration
limited to less than 10 times.
3.2.6. Summary
The revenue management models briefly described in Section 3.2 are the test bases for
the disutility simulations to be described in Chapters 5 through 8. For more detailed
explanations of revenue management methods see references noted in each section. Table
3-2 summarizes the specifications of each revenue management methods introduced in
this section. EMSRb is the only strictly leg based revenue management algorithm of our
interest. GVN and HBP also use leg based forecasting method, but maps the fares into
virtual buckets, qualifying as O-D revenue management method. DAVN does leg based
inventory control based on path based forecast, and both Netbid and ProBP fully uses
path based forecasting and path based control. EMSRb, GVN, and DAVN sets physical
booking limits to protect seats, whereas Netbid, HBP and ProBP only sets a minimum bid
price to be paid by a customer.
O-D algortihms
Table 3-2 Summary of revenue management algorithm specifications. Source: Gorin [91
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Revenue Management Data Collection ControType
Algorithm and Forecast Leg/O-D Limit/Bid
EMSRb Leg-based Leg-based Limit
GVN Leg-based Leg-based Limit
DAVN Path-based Leg-based Limit
Netbid Path-based Path-based Bid
HBP Leg-based Path-based Bid
ProBP Path-based Path-based Bid
17 Bratu [6]
The following Table 3-3 summarizes the standard O-D parameters for later experiments.
RM Method Description
EMSRb 4 fare classes, 16 reoptimization
GVN 16 virtual classes
System-wide virtual boundary definition
Netbid LP bid price/Availability processor
Reoptimizing every 200 bookings
DAVN 16 virtual classes
Reoptimizing every timeframe
Virtual classes re-defined every timeframe
Virtual classes defined leg specific
HBP 16 virtual classes
Reoptimizing every 200 bookings
ProBP Reoptimizing every 200 bookings
Maximum number of iterations = 10
1_ Convergence criteria < $10
Table 3-3 Summary of standard O-D parameters
3.3. Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS)
The Passenger Origin Destination Simulator, abbreviated as PODS, is a computer
simulation tool for testing airline revenue management schemes. It was originally
developed by C. Hopperstad and The Boeing Company and has served as the
experimental tool for the recent works in MIT Flight Transportation Laboratory. PODS
simulates a network of origin-destination markets for one or more airlines and produces
outputs in terms of bookings, revenues and loads. With these outputs users are able to
analyze the competitive implications of various revenue management methods. Wilson
[14] provides a thorough and detailed explanation of evolution and major features of the
simulator. In this section a brief introduction of PODS architecture (Section 3.3.1),
input/outputs (Section 3.3.2), and simulation environment for the experiment (Section
3.3.3) are provided.
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3.3.1. PODS Architecture
PODS provides the tools for simulating a competitive environment in which various
airlines compete over a network of numerous O-D markets. With the given network users
are able to test the competitive advantages or disadvantages of the different revenue
management methods in terms of various outputs. PODS also lets users to implement
passenger behavior models to see their impact on revenue management system
performance. Basically PODS architecture can be divided into four sub models;
passenger choice model, revenue management/seat inventory control model, forecaster
model, and historical database. Figure 3-1 shows how the PODS sub models function
interconnected.
PATH/CLASS
AVAILABILITY
Figure 3-1 PODS Architecture. Source: Hopperstad, The Boeing Company
The simulator starts at the Passenger Choice Model, where passenger preferences for a
path are decided depending on the passenger disutility model and other stochastic natures
of passenger behavior. The Passenger Choice Model is described more thoroughly in
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Section 4.1. In this process PODS generate passengers by passenger type with airline
preferences, maximum willingness to pay, and disutility costs. There are two passenger
types currently implemented in PODS; business passengers with higher maximum
willingness to pay and lower price sensitivity, and leisure passengers with lower
maximum willingness to pay and higher price sensitivity. With all these settings,
disutility cost of a given path and path availability, generated passengers make a choice
of whether to fly or not, and if so then on what path.
After a passenger inquires about an available fare class on some path, the Revenue
Management Module comes into action. Each airline, based on the different revenue
management algorithms in use, decides whether to accept the passenger booking or not.
As described in Section 3.2, the decision is made based on booking limits or bid prices
set by the revenue management algorithm. How booking limits/bid prices are determined
differs from one revenue management algorithm to another. However, all revenue
management algorithms use some kind of forecasting method to calculate booking limits
of bid prices based on the previous booking history.
The historical database is created by keeping record of booking histories starting from the
first booking of the simulation. The first part of sample departures, called burns, serves as
a pure historical database, not incorporated in the simulation output. More detailed
explanation of burns and samples are provided in the next section. The time line from the
start to each departure is divided in to timeframes, and at the end of each timeframe the
Revenue Management Module passes the booking information on to the historical
database. The forecaster then updates the historical database to generate a new forecast,
which in turn is used as a feedback to the Revenue Management Module.
The process described above repeats through user specified number of samples/trials, and
finally produces statistical results at the end of the simulation. Figure 3-2 summarizes the
sequential procedures in PODS simulation.
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Figure 3-2 PODS Flow chart. Source: Zickus [15]
3.3.2. Trials, Samples, Burns
Each departure in the simulation is called a "sample" in PODS terms. Currently the
standard number of samples per trial is set to 600. Every single sample becomes a
booking history data for the following samples. Hence in order to reduce the correlation
and obtain statistically sound results, we group samples by 600 each as a trial. A trial
serves as a unit run for a single case, which in most of our simulations is composed of 20
trials. A set of 20 trials is called a "case" which completes a single simulation. Since the
beginning part of each sample has little or no historical database to refer to, the first 200
samples are not used as a part of the results. Instead, PODS relaxes the capacity of first
50 sample departures to be four times the standard input capacity, and capacity of 51 -100
sample to be twice of the standard input capacity in order to obtain an unconstrained
demand forecast. Samples 101 to 200 are run with standard capacity, but still serve only
as a historical record to produce stable and reliable forecasts. These first 200 samples are
called "bums", and the number of samples burned is also a user defined input data. As a
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result, in standard settings with 600 samples, 20 trials, and 200 bums, we have total of
(600-200)*20=8,000 samples departures in a single case simulation.
3.3.3. Input Parameters
PODS allows a great deal of flexibility for the simulation, mostly controlled by the user.
The user-defined inputs are categorized in three parts; system-level inputs, airline inputs,
and market/path/leg inputs.
System level inputs determine the general characteristics of the simulation such as
simulation sizing variables, passenger behavioral coefficients, fare and reservation
structure descriptions, stochastic factors, and experimental design inputs. Airline inputs
define for each airline the revenue management system and airline carrier preferences.
Market inputs specify the mean schedule tolerance and time-of-day demand profile for
each market. Departure and arrival schedule, path quality index, component leg
identifiers are defined by path inputs. Capacity and distance for each leg are defined by
leg inputs. For more specific listings of input parameters see Zickus [15]. The key input
parameters for the purpose of this thesis are summarized in Table 3-4.
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e m........... ~ -:
Description Base Settings Description
Number of airlines 2 Index of RM optimization method
Number of legs 252 Index of forecasting method
Number of markets 482 Index of detruncator
Number of pax types 2 ......
Number of fare classes 4 Leg capacity
Number of restriction categories 3 Leg distance
Attributed cost k-factor 0.3 Number of paths in market
Multiplier (to basefares) for 3 Basef are of market, per pax type
Pr(willingness to pay=0.5), business pax Mean demand at basefare
Multiplier (to basefares) for 1.2 Coefficient of airline preference
Pr(willingness to pay=0.5), leisure pax Market fare
Path departure time
Path arrival time
Path quality index
Table 3-4 Important PODS input parameters. Adapted and summarized from Wilson [15]
3.3.4. Outputs
PODS records the output results of the simulation into two files; summary output file
(.SOT) and a general output file (.OUT). The summary output file provides overall results
of the simulation such as total revenues, average network load factors, Revenue
Passenger Miles, Average Seat Miles, average yields and unit costs per airline. It also
provides revenues and average network load factors broken up by banks18, as well as
summary of leg loads and actual choice of passengers given first choice. The general
input file has detailed listings of primary outputs such as revenues by trials, loads by
leg/market by fare class. Supplementary outputs like forecast and manifest demand are
attached to the general output file. The most frequently used outputs will be the net
revenues and average load factors by airline. However, the percentage of passengers with
a particular path choice given first choice is a useful measure of tracking passengers who
divert to other path/fare class options.
18 Hub-and-spoke network based airlines have one or more connecting banks in a day at the hub.
Connecting bank is a time window where incoming flights and outgoing flights are scheduled closely in
order to construct feasible and reasonable connecting schedules for passengers.
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3.4. Simulation Environment - Network D
For the purpose of testing various topics in revenue management and this thesis, Network
D was developed. Network D is a 42-city network, replicating actual locations of major
U.S. cities. Two of the 42 cities are hub cities for two airlines, the rest of them are the
spoke cities where both airlines operate scheduled flights. All traffic flows from 20
western cities to 20 eastern cities, distances from the hub ranging from 125 to 1514 miles.
On this network there are 3 bank schedules, at 10:30 AM, 2:00 PM, and 5:30 PM. There
are total of 252 flight legs including inter-hub legs operated on this network in a day,
with 482 O-D markets.
Network D with its large scale is representative of actual airline hub networks in the real
world. The size of outputs as well as inputs is very large, compared to what was
previously simulated in PODS (See Lee [12]). With interhub flights and multiple banks,
passengers now have fare more choice of path options, resembling the variety of path
choices of real world travelers. Figure 3-3 illustrates the geographical layout of Network
D, followed by the summary of major characteristics.
Figure 3-3 Network D layout
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<Summary of Network D Characteristics>
- 40 spoke cities with 2 hubs, one for each airline
- 20 spoke cities on each side, located by geographical coordinates of actual US cities
- Distance -- 125-1514 miles to the hub from spoke cities
- Unidirectional: West to east flow of traffic
- Interhub services, one for each direction, for each bank, for each airline
- 3 banks starting at 10:30, 14:00, 17:30 per each airline
o 21 flights arrive at 10:30AM, 2PM, and 5:30PM at each hub
o Bank duration is 1 hour
o 21 flights depart at 11:30AM, 3PM, and 6:30PM from each hub
- 252 flight legs, 482 O-D markets
3.5. Summary
This chapter gives an overview of airline revenue management and the simulation tool
used later in this thesis, Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS). Conventional
airline revenue management methods can be categorized into two groups, Fare Class
Yield Management (FCYM) and Origin-Destination revenue management methods.
FCYM methods gather data and perform inventory control on a flight leg basis, which
leads to some shortcomings such as neglecting high fare connecting passengers on
multiple leg itineraries. Due to the reasons mentioned in Section 3.1 there had been
efforts to develop O-D revenue management, and some products of those efforts were
described in Section 3.2.
PODS provides the tools for simulating a competitive environment which two or more
airlines compete over a network of O-D markets. Developing the passenger choice model
and simulating with PODS is the major issue for later chapters of this thesis. A
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hypothetical 42-city network, Network D, serves as a simulation environment for the
purpose of testing the impacts of disutility model discussed in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4 Modeling Airline Passenger Disutilities
Airline passenger disutilities have considerable impact on passenger path choice. The
passenger path choice directly influences airlines' revenues. Therefore the challenge that
we face in order to gain a logical perspective on how passenger disutilities can be related
to airline revenues is to find a reliable model that represents passenger disutilities. First,
this chapter will go through a basic approach to disutilities programmed in PODS
(Section 4.1). Afterwards, actual parameters for three passenger disutilities will be
derived (Section 4.3), using the survey results from the airline experts (Section 4.2),
followed by a chapter summary in Section 4.4.
4.1. Disutility Functions in PODS
When PODS generates demand for each market, it will also choose passenger disutility
values for each passenger generated. PODS then uses its own algorithm to assign path
choice for each of those passengers. If a passenger's favorite path is unavailable, the
passenger will spill or seek his/her second favorite path. As explained briefly in this
section, the passenger disutility model plays an essential role in the PODS passenger
assignment model (Section 4.1.2). Section 4.1.3 examines how passenger disutilities are
represented by a probabilistic model and how it is applied in PODS. Finally Section 4.1.4
will show an example of calculating total cost.
4.1.1. How Disutility Functions Work in PODS
In order to measure the attractiveness of each fare class/path option generated, PODS
needs to calculate the "total cost" of the path options. The term "total cost" will be
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distinguished from the nominal cost, which is the actual dollar value of an airline ticket.
Alternatively, "total cost" includes the dollar value of the inconvenience coming from
each restriction of the lower fare options, as well as the out-of-pocket money paid
(nominal cost). Disutility functions are used to convert these inconveniences into
comparable dollar values.
PODS refers to disutility functions to compute each passenger's disutility costs for all
disutility categories defined in the simulator. The four disutility categories anticipated in
PODS are:
o Fare class restriction disutility
o Unfavorite airline disutility
o Path quality index disutility
o Replanning disutility
Disutility costs are calculated and summed with the nominal fare of the selected fare class
option. This sum is designated as "total cost" of each path and fare class combination.
Among the options of fare class/path with nominal cost not exceeding each passenger's
generated maximum willingness to pay, PODS will compare the total fare of each option
and choose the fare class/path of minimum total cost to represent the passenger's first
choice path option.
4.1.2. PODS 8 Passenger Assignment Model
The PODS 8 passenger assignment model basically generates passengers and assigns
them to the best path/fare class option. If there are no seats available within the
passenger's choice set of paths, the passenger will be spilled. The detailed process of
passenger assignment model is described below.
1. Generate demand by market, by passenger type (business passenger or leisure
passenger).
2. Scramble the arrival order
3. For a given market and path type, pick
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a. Favorite airlines - ordinarily set the same for each airline
b. The decision window - pick the earliest possible departing time and the
latest possible arrival time
c. The path quality costs
d. The cost for non-favorite airline use
e. The cost for fare class restrictions
f. The cost for replanning
4. For a given market and passenger type, pick the maximum willingness to pay
(XPAY)
5. Screen-out paths and fare classes with fares greater than maximum willingness to
pay (fare>XPAY)
6. If no paths are remaining with seats available, spill out the passenger
7. If paths do remain, compute the following for each screened-in path and fare class
combination
Total Cost for path/fare class option
= Fare
+ Path quality cost*Path Quality Index
+ Unfavorite airline cost (If unfavorite airline)
+ Restriction costs
+ Replanning costs
8. Assign passenger to the lowest total cost path/fare class
9. Proceed to the next passenger, go to step 3.
The process described above is also outlined in Figure 4-1. In the passenger choice
model, step 3 is where the disutility functions are involved. The four categories, path
quality cost, unfavorite airline cost, fare class restriction cost, and, replanning cost are
essentially calculated according to disutility functions defmed and input by the users.
Disutility functions will be explained more thoroughly in the Section 4.1.3.
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GCenerate
eDisutility cost for connecting flights (Path quality)
e Disutility cost for unfavorite airline (s)
e Disutility cost for fare class restrictions
e Disutility cost for replanning
e Favorite airline
Decision window
Generate Maximum Willingness-To-Pay (WTP)
Any available path No
/fare classes qualify?
(Fare < Max. WTP)
Yes
Compute Total Perceived Cost For Each Qualified Path/Fare Class
Total Perceived Cost = Fare
+ Disutility cost for connecting flights
+ Disutility cost if unfavorite airline
+ Disutility cost for fare class restrictions
+ Disutility cost for replanning if outside window
Allocation Process Amongst Qualified Path/Fare Classes
eAssign passenger to the path/fare class with the lowest total
perceived cost
Repeat for each passenger (Passenger Spilled -
Figure 4-1 PODS8 Passenger Choice Model"
4.1.3. Disutility Costs
Disutility costs are chosen from a normal distribution. The mean value and standard
deviation of the Gaussian distribution for disutility costs are defined to have different
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19 Adapted from Lee [12]
values for each market, depending on the distance of the O-D market. It also depends on
passenger types and for the purpose of this thesis the passengers are classified into two
types, leisure and business. We can represent the disutility cost for a passenger type in a
certain O-D market to be N(p,(ky) 2 ), where L is the mean disutility cost at that market,
and k is the k-factor of the normal distribution. When generating a passenger, PODS will
pick a value from the disutility distribution curve with a probability according to the
Gaussian probability distribution. The four disutility categories have different averages,
while all disutility costs have a Gaussian distribution. The k factor for all cost
distributions have taken the value 0.3 for all the simulations up to the present, which is
the value widely recognized to represent the stochasticity of air transportation demand as
numerous empirical studies have shown2 .
The representation of all disutility cost probability density functions are expressed as:
<Business>
Restriction 1 disutility cost = N(R1, (kR1,B ) 2 )
Restriction 2 disutility cost = N(pR2,B (kR 2,B ) 2 )
Restriction 3 disutility cost = N(pR3,B (kR3,B ) 2 )
Unfavorite airline disutility cost = N(UFA,B (kUA,B 2)
Path quality disutility cost per PQI =N(IPQI,B (kPQI,B ) 2)
Replanning disutility cost = N(pRP,B (kRP,B ) 2 )
<Leisure>
Restriction 1 disutility cost = N(pR1,L (kR1,L ) 2 )
Restriction 2 disutility cost = N(pR 2 ,L (kR 2 ,L ) 2 )
Restriction 3 disutility cost = N(pR3,L (kR 3,L )2 )
Unfavorite airline disutility cost = N(UFA,L (kUFA,L ) 2 )
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20 Wilson [14] p.46
Path quality disutility cost per PQl =N(IPQ,L (kylPQ,L) 2 )
Replanning disutility cost = N(pRP,L I(kORP,L ) 2 )
The average of each distribution, pDisuilityCategory,PaxType, can be expressed as a function of
the market distance and/or fares since the perceived cost for a disutility will be heavily
market dependent. In order to set a comparable representation of each market in dollar
terms, the concept of "market basefare" is introduced. Market basefare is a parameter that
serves as a basis of comparison for fares, passenger maximum willingness to pay, and
passenger disutility costs between different markets. For instance the market basefares
are used to determine the fares for each markets, as Q class fare set equal to leisure
passenger's basefares. One important attribute of a market that determines the fare and
cost level is the market distance, as can be observed in most of the real world air
transportation markets. Therefore it is reasonable to express the market basefares as a
linear function of market distances for each of the passenger types, as follows:
BasefareLeisure = 50+0.075*distance (4. 1)
BasefareBusiness = 2.5*(50+0.075*distance) (4. 2)
The average of each disutility cost distribution now can be expressed as a function of
market basefares. The simulations presented later in this thesis assume that
pDisutilityCategory,PaxType is an increasing linear function of market basefares; hence the average
disutility cost is higher for long distance markets with high market basefares. Equation
(4.3) shows that mean disutility cost is a linear function of the market distance, with
coefficients to be determined for each disutility category and for each passenger type.
= a + b*basefare, a and b to be determined (4.3)
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Restriction Disutility Cost
Definitions of restrictions in PODS simulations
There are three kinds of restriction categories currently applied in PODS simulations.
Restriction 1 is defmed as the 'Saturday night stay' restriction, which requires the
passenger to stay over a Saturday night at the destination. Restriction 2 indicates that
there will be a penalty fee when a passenger wants to change or cancel the trip.
Restriction 3 is non-refundability of airline tickets, which is only applied to the lowest
fare class. Among the four fare classes currently used in for PODS simulation, Y class
has no restrictions applied, B class has only restriction 1 applied, M class has restriction 1
and 2 active, and, all three restrictions apply for Q class. The relations of restrictions and
fare classes are summarized in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Summary of restriction categories and fare class applications
Restriction disutility costs
As explained in Section 4.1.3, disutility costs for each restriction category have a normal
distribution. The mean value of each distribution is determined by the market distance,
strictly speaking, by the basefare of the market. Recall that market basefares are defmed
as a linear function of market distances, as in equations (4.1) and (4.2).
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Restrictions 1 2 3
Decription Saturday night Cancellation/ Nonrefundable
stav chanae eat
Y Class x x x
B Class o x x
M Class o o x
Q Class o o o
4.1.3.1.
The coefficients or disutility functions for all three restriction categories for each
passenger type were determined by the earlier works of Wilson [14]21. The coefficients of
each restriction disutility cost were preliminarily based on the market research conducted
at Boeing (1988), along with the constraint that the for business passengers lower fare
classes should be less attractive and for leisure passengers the lower fare classes should
be more attractive. This constraint was made to assure that the restriction disutility
function reflects the fare class segmentation schemes of the actual airlines, which define
fare classes such that a fare product is superior to fare products of lower fares in every
restriction element. An example of coefficients being used in PODS is shown in Table 4-
2.
Table 4-2 Coefficients of restriction disutilities
For example, the mean value of disutility for Restriction 1 (Saturday night stay) for a
business passenger in market with basefare equal to $500 can be found using equation
(4.3), as follows:
pR1B ($500) = 0 + 0.9*$500 = $450 (4. 4)
Examples of restriction disutility costs
With the disutility functional coefficients defmed in Table 4-2, and with a k-factor of 0.3,
we can provide an example of what restriction disutilities will be for a certain passenger.
As Table 4-1 shows, only the first restriction applies for passengers traveling a market
distance of 1000 miles, in a B class. For M class, restrictions 1 and 2 apply, and the
21 Wilson [14], Chapter 4 The Operational Competitive Simulation Environment
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Business Leisure
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope
Restriction 1 0 0.9 0 1.75
Parameters Restriction 2 0 0.3 0 0.25
Restriction 3 0 0.3 0 0.25
disutility costs of both restrictions need to be added for total restriction disutility cost.
However, for the sake of simplicity, let's begin our example with B class choice.
First, the basefare is determined by market distance (1000 miles) and passenger type
(business), as denoted in equation (4.2).
BasefareBusiness(1000 mi) = 2.5*(50+0.075*1000 mi)=$312.5 (4. 5)
Next, with the basefare determined, mean disutility cost for restriction 1 can be found
using coefficients in Table 4-2 and equation (4.3).
pR1,B($312.5) = 0 + 0.9*$312.5 = $281.25 (4.6)
Since the mean value of the disutility cost distribution with k-factor of 0.3 is known, the
mean disutility cost in this market for B class will be picked from the probabilistic
distribution of:
Disutility cost(Restrictions, business passenger, B class) = N($281.25, $84.3752)
Example of restriction disutility cost relative to fare structure
As an example showing how restriction disutility costs compare to actual fares, Table 4-3
shows a sample PODS fare structure and restriction disutility cost at market distance of
1000 miles. In this case, the restriction disutilities are defined such that the highest fare
class is most attractive for an average business passenger. For leisure passengers it would
be opposite, Q class would have lowest average total cost.
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Average Dis(Rel) N/A $281.25 $281.25 $281.25
Average Dis(Re2) N/A N/A $93.75 $93.75
Business Average Dis(Re3) N/A N/A N/A $93.75
Fare $500.00 $250.00 . $187.50 $125.00
Average Total Cost $500.00 $531.25 $562.50 $593.75
Average Dis(Rel) N/A $218.75 $218.75 $281.25
Average Dis(Re2) N/A N/A $31.25 $31.25
Leisure Average Dis(Re3) N/A N/A N/A $31.25
Fare $500.00 $250.00 $187.50 $125.00
Average Total Cost $500.00 1 $468.75 $437.50 $468.75
Table 4-3 Sample fare structure and average restriction disutility costs for market distance of 1000
miles
4.1.3.2. Unfavorite Airline Disutility Cost
Unfavorite airline is a term used to describe the airline, which is not the passenger's first
preference. If a passenger's path option is with the unfavorite airline, the unfavorite
airline disutility cost is added into the total cost of the path. PODS assumes that each
passenger always has a favorite airline, and the other airline will be the unfavorite airline.
The probability of airline A (or airline B) being the favorite airline is decided with the
input parameter. Previously, all simulations set the preference of each airline to be 0.5
and unfavorite airline disutility costs to be $0, effectively ignoring any passenger
preference for airlines.
For example, for the market distance of 1000 miles, the basefares for business passengers
in equation (4.5) were already calculated, to be $312.5. If the intercept and slope of the
unfavorite airline disutility function are aUFABand bUFA,B, respectively, the mean value of
this disutility cost is:
MUFA,B($ 3 1 2 5 ) = aUFA,B + UFA,B*$ 3 12 .5 (4.7)
In most previous PODS simulations with aUFAB =bUFA,B=0, and k factor of 0.3, the mean
and standard deviation of the unfavorite airline disutility in this market is 0.
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4.1.3.3. Path Quality Index Disutility Cost
Path Quality Index
Path Quality Index is an indication of the convenience of the given path. In PODS path
quality is measured strictly in terms of number of stops and connects in the path.
PQI = 1 + # of stops + 2*# of connections (4.8)
For example, the PQI of a path with one connection will be 3.
PQI disutility costs
PQI disutility cost per PQI is determined in a manner similar to the methods of
determining other disutility costs. We input the intercept and slope for the disutility
function to determine the mean value of the disutility cost distribution at a give market
distance. For example, for a business passenger at market distance of 1000 miles with a
basefare of $312.5, the mean of disutility cost per unit PQI is calculated as:
YPQI,B($ 3 12 .5) = aPQI,B + bPQ,B*$ 3 12 .5 (4.9)
where aPQI,B and bPQB are the intercept and slope of the PQI disutility function. With
the setting of aPQIB =$25 and bpQI B =0, pPQIB will be $25. If the path option includes
with one connection (therefore PQI=3) the PQI disutility cost distribution is:
Disutility cost(PQI, business passenger) = N(3*$25, 3*$7.52)
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Replanning Disutility Cost
If a passenger's path option is outside his/her initially determined decision window, the
replanning disutility cost is added into the total cost of the path. The disutility cost of
replanning is also normally distributed with a mean determined by input parameters. For
example, for business passengers replanning for a market distance of 1000 miles, the
mean of replanning disutility cost is:
RP,B($312.5) = aRP,B +bRP,B*$ 3 12 .5  (4.10)
where aRPB and bRPB are the intercept and slope of the replanning disutility function.
With aRP,B =$0 and bRP,B 0, IPQI,B is $0.
4.1.4. Total Cost
Using the previous examples of a business passenger in a market distance of 1000 miles
in B class with one connection with the unfavorite airline and a path outside the decision
window, the total disutility cost is the sum of the restriction disutility cost, the unfavorite
airline disutility cost, the PQI disutility cost, the replanning disutility cost, and the
nominal fare.
Total Cost = B class nominal fare $250
+ Restriction disutility N($281.25, $84.3752
+ Unfavorite airline disutility N($0, $0)
+ PQI disutility N($75, 3*$7.52)
+ Replanning disutility N($0, $0)
In order to obtain realistic distributions for each of the disutility categories in the above
equation, a survey asking probabilistic passenger behavior was conducted to a group of
airline experts, with more explanation in Section 4.2. The estimations generated from
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4.1.3.4.
survey results are needed for the realistic values of slopes and intercepts of the unfavorite
airline, PQI, and replanning disutility functions. After these coefficients of disutility
functions are determined (Section 4.3), the impact of disutility costs of each disutility
category will be tested and analyzed (Chapters 5~6).
4.2. The Survey
4.2.1. Background
In order to get the idea of passengers' sensitivity to unfavorite airlines, path qualities, and
replanning, we conducted a survey asking the probability that passengers would pay for a
higher fare class rather than put up with disutilities. The respondents of the survey were
thirteen airline experts from six airlines of the PODS consortium. The answers given by
the respondents are based on their perceptions of actual consumer choice behavior. These
answers are the basis of the disutility model derived in Section 4.3.
4.2.2. Assumptions
Base Case Network Assumptions
The notional base case assumptions for the questions given in the survey are:
" A bow tie design with 5 spoke cities on each side
" Two airlines operating on this network
" Two separate hub cities, with inter-hub flights
" Two banks per day per airline (possibly non-synchronized)
" Two paths per day per airline per market
" Four fare classes and three nested restrictions
The layout for this network is shown in Figure 4-2.
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Origin Spoke Cities Destination Spoke Cities
Figure 4-2 Layout for the notional base case network for the survey
Passenger Assumptions
There are also assumptions presented in the survey for the passengers traveling
throughout this hypothetical network. For the survey, a typical business passenger is
assumed to have maximum willingness-to-pay exceeding the fare for fare class 1.
Furthermore, the disutility attributed for restriction 1, which is assigned to fare class 2, is
less than the fare difference between fare class 1 and fare class 2. These assumptions can
be interpreted such that under ideal circumstances with all fare classes open and all paths
open, a typical business passenger will choose fare class 2 as his/her first choice.
However, in the survey we limit the favorite path choice to be closed, forcing the
passengers to either purchase higher fare class of same path choice or spill to another
path choice. Finally, a typical business passenger's choice set is limited to fare classes 1
and 2 and to two paths given in each question of the survey, of which (path 1, class 2) is
closed.
Path Path 2
Fare Class 1 Open Open
Fare Class 2 Closed Open
Table 4-4 Choice set of a business passenger
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Assumptions for leisure passengers are symmetrical to the business passenger
assumptions. A typical leisure passenger's maximum willingness-to-pay includes only
fare class 3 and 4, and the disutility attributed to restriction 3, which is applied only to
fare class 4, is less then the fare difference between fare class 3 and fare class 4. Hence,
under ideal circumstances a typical leisure passenger's first choice will be in fare class 4.
Finally, a typical leisure passenger's choice set is limited to fare classes 3 and 4 (explicit
from the maximum willingness-to-pay assumption) and two path choices given by each
question.
Path 1 Path 2
Fare Class 3 Open Open
Fare Class 4 Closed Open
Table 4-5 Choice set for leisure passengers
4.2.3. Questions and Answers
The survey consists of three parts; the probability of a random passenger buying a fare
class higher rather than the fare class of his/her choice with the unfavorite airline, path
quality, and replanning disutility applied. Each part has two questions: one for business
passengers and one for leisure passengers. All questions are answered for four different
market distances, 500, 1000, 2000, and 4000 miles.
u Question 1 - Unfavorite Airline
Question 1 asks the respondent to provide the probability that the unfavorite airline
disutilities are greater than the fare differences of two fare class choices for each
passenger type.
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Business
What do you estimate is the probability of a random business passenger choosing fare
class 1 of his/her favorite airline rather that fare class 2 of the unfavorite airline if all else
is equal?
Distance 500 1000 2000 4000
Average 34.2% 36.9% 40.0% 43.5%
Std 12.8% 9.3% 10.9% 16.3%
Table 4-6 Average and standard deviation of answers for the probability of selling up instead of
taking unfavorite airline for business passengers
Airline experts estimated that 34.2% to 43.5% of business passengers will sell up to fare
class one instead of flying with the unfavorite airline, given that his/her first choice fare
class on favorite airline is closed down.
Leisure
What do you estimate is the probability of a random leisure passenger choosing fare class
3 of his/her favorite airline rather that fare class 4 of the unfavorite airline if all else is
equal?
Distance 500 1000 2000 4000
Average 11.5% 11.2% 13.8% 15.8%
Std 6.4% 4.9% 7.0% 19.8%
Table 4-7 Average and standard deviation of answers for the probability of selling up instead of
taking unfavorite airline for leisure passengers
From the survey results, 11.5% to 15.8% of the leisure passengers are expected to sell up
when their favorite airline's first choice fare class (fare class 4) is closed down.
For both type of passengers, the presumed probability of selling up is higher for longer
distance markets. The factors that would work against flying on the unfavorite airline
would be frequent flyer advantages or loyalty towards one's favorite airline. The survey
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results show that the advantages and "loyalty" of a favorite airline would be more
important at longer distances with higher nominal fares. Hence, the disutility cost of an
unfavorite airline increases as market distance increases. Moreover, the probability of
selling up is higher for business passengers, meaning that business passengers tend to be
more sensitive to which airline they are flying.
a Question 2 - Path Quality
Question 2 asks about the probability that the disutility of a connecting path is greater
than the fare difference of two fare class choices for each passenger type.
Business
What do you estimate is the probability of a random business passenger choosing fare
class 1 for a non-stop path over fare class 2 of a connecting path if all else is equal?
Distance 500 1000 2000 4000
Average 72.3% 60.0% 47.7% 39.6%
Std 15.8% 14.6% 18.5% 17.9%
Table 4-8 Average and standard deviation of answers for the probability of selling up instead of
taking a connecting path for business passengers
The airline experts answered that up to 72.4% of business passengers would sell up to
fare class 1 rather than flying a one-stop path. This percentage was higher for shorter
market distances.
Leisure
What do you estimate is the probability of a random leisure passenger choosing fare class
3 of a non-stop path over fare class 4 of a connecting path, if all else is equal?
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Distance 500 1000 2000 4000
Average 38.5% 28.1% 19.2% 15.0%
Std 17.2% 17.5% 19.3% 19.9%
Table 4-9 Average and standard deviation of answers for the probability of selling up instead of
taking a connecting path for leisure passengers
Both business and leisure passengers are expected to have a higher probability of selling
up in shorter distance markets. Presumably, the time delay from a stopover seems longer
for shorter trips, making the advantages of a non-stop path decrease for longer haul
markets. Another interpretation would be that path quality disutility tends to decrease for
longer distances.
a Question 3 - Replanning
Question 3 asks for estimates of the probability that the disutilities of replanning are
greater than the fare differences of two fare class choices for each passenger type.
Business
What do you estimate is the probability of a random business passenger choosing fare
class 1 in his/her decision window rather than fare class 2 with replanning?
Distance 500 1000 2000 4000
Average 67.7% 60.1% 55.3% 49.6%
Std 23.6% 18.0% 16.4% 19.8%
Table 4-10 Average and standard deviation of answers for the probability of selling up instead of
replanning for business passengers
Leisure
What do you estimate as the probability of a random leisure passenger choosing fare class
3 in his/her decision window rather than fare class 4 with replanning?
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Distance 500 1000 2000 4000
Average 27.7% 24.2% 20.4% 18.5%
Std 17.9% 16.9% 18.1% 19.7%
Table 4-11 Average and standard deviation of answers for the probability of selling up instead of
replanning for leisure passengers
Replanning disutility costs, as presented, tend to decrease for longer haul trips, meaning
that long distance trips with longer durations are planned with more flexibility. The
percentage of passengers who would pay more rather than replan their trips tends to
decrease, as market distances get longer.
u Summary
Generally all disutility costs resulting from the survey probabilities are estimated higher
for business passengers than leisure passengers. In other words, business passengers are
judged to be more sensitive to various inconveniences, whereas leisure passengers are
more sensitive to fares. Using these results, we are ready to model the individual
disutility functions for all cases mentioned in the survey, illustrated in Section 4.3.
4.3. Building Disutility Models
The average probability values given in the survey, allow estimation of the slope and
intercept of the three disutility functions for business and leisure passengers. Recall from
Section 4.1 that the mean value of a disutility functions is linear function of market
basefares, which turns out to be a linear function of market distances. Therefore, the next
step requires establishing a reasonable representation of disutility function, i.e. the value
of the slope and intercept of each disutility functions. The survey results provide the data
necessary for this derivation.
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4.3.1. Parameters Required
As shown in equation (4.3), the mean value of a disutility distribution is a linear function
of the basefare at that distance for a given passenger.
p = a + b*basefare, a and b to be determined (4. 3)
The coefficients a and b are defined for all disutility categories, and values can be derived
for the three disutility categories in the survey. Each of the three categories has a pair of
coefficients (a,b); for each categories, and for the two passenger types, the resulting 6
pairs of coefficients can be determined. These coefficients are determined by deriving the
mean value of each disutility at market distance of 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 miles, then
performing a linear regression over the basefares for those market distances.
4.3.2. Determining Parameters from Survey
From the probabilities that a passenger will sell up at any of the four different market
distances, we can obtain the intercept and slope of each disutility through the following
procedure. First we calculate the base fare for distances of 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000
miles, for each passenger type. Then we derive the mean value for each disutility
distribution for each passenger type for distances of 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 miles, for
each passenger type, based on survey results. Finally, we do a linear regression of the
mean disutility cost over basefares to produce the intercept and slope of each mean
disutility cost.
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4.3.2.1. Sample Calculation For Unfavorite Airline Disutility. Business
Passenger
Background and Assumptions
This example demonstrates the procedure of how this is done for the case of business
passenger with the unfavorite airline disutility. Starting with market distance of 500
miles, the basic assumptions for the given case are shown in Table 4-12.
Market distance = 500 miles
BasefareBusiness = 2.5*(50+0.075*500)=$218.75
BasefareLeisure = 50+0.075*500=$87.5
Fare Class Restrictions Fares
1 N/A 4*Class 4 Fare = $350
2 1 2*Class 4 Fare = $175
3 1,2 1.5*Class 4 Fare = $131.25
4 1,2,3 50 + 0.075*500 =$87.5
Table 4-12 Basic parameters needed for the calculation of the mean disutility cost
The Total Cost
This survey has given the probability that a business passenger whose first choice is
airline 1 fare class 2 will choose (airline 1, fare class 1), instead of (airline 2, fare class 2),
when fare class 2 of favorite airline (airline 1) is closed. It is the probability that the total
cost of the path choice for (airline 1, fare class 1), given that first path choice of this
passenger which is path choice (airline 1, fare class 2) is closed, is smaller than the total
cost of path choice (airline 2 fare class 2). The total cost for these two case are compared
in Table 4-13.
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Airline 1, Fare class 1 Airline 2, Fare class 2
Unfavorite Airline? No Yes
Path Quality Index 1 (non-stop) 1 (non-stop)
Replanning? No No
Nominal Fare $350 $175
Restriction Disutility $0 $x
UFA Disutility $0 $y
PQI Disutility $z $z
RpIn Disutility $0 $0
Total Cost 350+z 175+x+y+z
Table 4-13 Total cost calculation for the two path choice options
The variables x, y, and z in Table 4-13 represent conditional restriction 1 disutility,
unfavorite airline disutility, and path quality index disutility. With these calculations, the
question in the survey is asking the probability that 350+z is less than 175+x+y+z. In
Table 4-6, we can see that this probability is estimated by the survey respondents as
34.2% with standard deviation of 12.8%. Mathematically:
Pr(350+ z > 175+ x + y + z) = Pr(x+ y <175)=0.342 (4.11)
where x is the conditional disutility of restriction 1, given that the first choice is fare class
2 of airline 1, and y is the unfavorite airline disutility. In other words, the survey is asking
the probability that the sum of the conditional disutility cost for restriction 1 and the
disutility cost of the unfavorite airline is greater than the fare difference of class 1 and
class 2.
Conditional Distribution of Restriction 1 Disutility Cost, f(x)
This approach looks at each disutility as a Gaussian distribution, hence both x and y can
be presented in the form of a probability density function. The variable x comes from the
distribution for the restriction 1 disutility; only it is a conditional distribution. For the
probability density function for x, first define:
66
o Event A: A business passenger's first choice is fare class 2 of airline 1 (the
favorite airline)
E f i = N(pR1,B,500mi CR1,B,500mi2 e (DiSR1 i bR1,B,500mi)
-,1ircR1,B,500mi 2 aR1,B,500mi
(4.12)
(the probability density function of the restriction 1 disutility cost for business passengers at
market distance of 500 miles, expressed as a normal distribution)
o R1,B,500mi = +.9 *$218.75 = $196.88, from (4.4) and Table 4-12 (4.13)
o aR1,B,500mi = k* MR1,B,500mi , Where k=0.3 (system-wide k factor)
=$59.06 (4.14)
Then, by definition, the distribution of x, f(x), will be in the following form:
f (x) = f (DisR1 I A)
The probability of event A, which is the probability that a random business passenger's
first choice is fare class 2 of his/her favorite airline, can be interpreted as that the total
cost of the path choice for airline 1 fare class 2 is less than the total cost of path choice
for airline 1 fare class 1. Then as shown in 4-13, the total cost for these two options can
be compared by category.
Airline 1, Fare class 1 Airline 1, Fare class 2
Unfavorite Airline? No No
Path Quality Index 1 (non-stop) 1 (non-stop)
Replanning? No No
Nominal Fare $350 $175
Restriction Disutility $0 $x1
UFA Disutility $0 $0
PQI Disutility $z1 $z1
RpIn Disutility $0 $0
Total Cost I 350+z1  175+x1+z1
Table 4-14 Total cost calculation table for fare class 1 and 2
As a result, the probability of event A is expressed as:
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Pr(A) = Pr(350+ z > 175+x + z,) = Pr(x, < $175)
The probability density function of x, f(x), becomes:
fIA)f (x 1 x, <175) (4.16)
f(x) =f(DisRl rx 15Pr(x, < 175)
where f (x,)= f(DSR1,B,500mi) = N(196.88,59.06 2 ), from (4.12), (4.13), and (4.14), and
Pr(x <175) = P(Z < 175-196.88)= P(Z < -0.37) = 0.356, (4.17)
59.06
Equations (4.16) and (4.17) generate the probability density function, mean value, and the
standard deviation of the variable x as following:
0.356 * 1 * exp -(x -196.88) 2fx= **exp (4.18)0.356 27r*59.06 2*59.062
E(x) = fx* f (x)dx = $134.84 (4.19)
a(x) = JE(x2 ) -{E(x)}2 = $32.09 (4.20)
Unfavorite Airline Disutility Distribution
So far, the analysis has looked at the variable x in the equation (4.11) given. Now,
attention needs to turn to how variable y, which is the unfavorite airline disutility cost,
can be represented in order to solve equation (4.11). Solving this equation will provide
the mean value of the unfavorite airline disutility for business passengers, at market
distance of 500 miles. Let this parameter be pUFAB,500mi . By assuming that the unfavorite
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(4.15)
airline disutility cost has Gaussian distribution, the probability density function of y looks
like:
f (y) = N(pUFA,B,500 mi .UFA,B500mi 2 ), where a
UFA,B,500mi
,k =0.3 (4.21)
Back to the Survey Question
Now, if x+y=w, the master equation (4.11) can be expressed as following:
Pr(x+ y <175) = Pr(w < 175) = 0.342 (4.22)
Random variable y is already assumed to have a Gaussian distribution. Additionally, by
assuming that the conditional distribution of the restriction 1 disutility cost also has a
Gaussian distribution, the average and the standard deviation of the variable w, which is
the linear sum of the two variables, can be obtained.
E(w) = E(x) + E(y) = 13 4 .84 +pUFA,B,500mi
a(w) = {a(x)} 2 +{a(y)} 2 = 32.09 2 +(0.3UFA,B,500mi ) 2
(4.23)
(4.24)
Since by definition the sum of independent Gaussian probability density functions is also
a Gaussian probability density function, variable w has a normal distribution. Now the
equation (4.22) becomes
P(w > 175) = P Z > 175 E(w) 0.34 (4.25)
Inserting (4.23) and (4.24) into (4.25), and solving for pUFA,B,500mi,
pUFA,B,500mi =$26.12
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Calculations for 1000, 2000, 4000 miles
Similar procedures produce the mean disutility cost for market distances of 1000, 2000,
and 4000 miles. The calculated mean unfavorite airline disutility cost and business
passenger basefares for those markets are shown in Table 4-15.
Market Distance(mi) 500 1000 2000 4000
BasefareBusiness $218.75 $312.50 $500.00 $875.00
Mean UFA Disutility $26.12 $40.92 $71.87 $138.01
Table 4-15 Mean unfavorite airline disutility cost for business passengers
Linear Regression - Intercept and Slope
Table 4-15 shows the mean unfavorite airline disutility cost for four basefare levels.
Linear regression over these four sets of data give the intercept and slope of the
unfavorite airline disutility function for business passengers. Results and the significance
tests of the regression are shown in Table 4-16.
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.999776171
R Square 0.999552391
Adjusted R Square 0.999328587
Standard Error 1.286714238
Observations 4
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept -12.29149892 1.379122548 -8.912550184
X Variable 1 0.17106473 0.002559717 66.82955534
Table 4-16 Resulting intercept and slope of mean unfavorite airline disutility, for business
passengers, with statistical test results
The calculation gives an intercept of -12.29 and a slope of 0.17 with an R square value
over 99% for the business passenger for unfavorite airline disutility function. The t-
statistics for both the intercept and slope are large enough to assume the statistical
significance of the derived coefficients.
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Unfavorite Airline Disutility, Leisure Passengers
Calculations for the leisure passengers go through similar procedure, except restriction 1
and 2 disutility costs are added for both options (airline 1, fare class 3) and (airline 2, fare
class 4). For the latter path choice, conditional disutility cost for restriction 3, given that
the passenger's first choice is fare class 4, is added to the cost. A "total cost calculation
table" can be constructed similar to Table 4-13.
Airline 1, Fare class 3 Airline 2, Fare class 4
Unfavorite Airline? No Yes
Path Quality Index 1 (non-stop) 1 (non-stop)
Replanning? No No
Nominal Fare $131.25 $87.5
Restriction Disutility $R1+$R2 $R1 +$R2+$x
UFA Disutility $0 $y
PQI Disutility $z $z
RpIn Disutility $0 $0
Total Cost 131 .25+R1 +R2+z 87.5+R1 +R2+x+y+z
Table 4-17 Total cost calculation table for leisure passengers on the unfavorite airline
R1 and R2 are restriction disutility costs for restrictions 1 and 2, x is the conditional
disutility for restriction 1, y is the unfavorite airline disutility for leisure passengers, and z
is the path quality index disutility cost. The master equation representing the survey
question is (from Table 4-17 and Table 4-6):
Pr(131.25+R1+R2+z>87.5+R1+R2+x+y+z)=Pr(x+y<43.75) =0.115 (4.26)
In other words, the probability that the sum of the unfavorite airline disutility and the
conditional disutility cost of restriction 3, given that the passenger's first choice is fare
class 4 of his/her favorite airline, is greater than the fare difference of class 3 and class 4.
Through the same derivation as in the business passenger case, the mean disutility cost
for four distances used in the survey are shown in Table 4-18.
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4.3.2.2.
Market Distance(mi) 500 1000 2000 4000
BasefareLeisure $87.50 $125.00 $200.00 $350.00
Mean UFA Disutility $7.68 $10.87 $19.09 $35.19
Table 4-18 Mean unfavorite airline disutility cost for leisure passengers
Linear regression gives the intercept and slope of the unfavorite airline disutility function
for leisure passengers, as in Table 4-18. Statistical test results are also displayed in Table
4-19.
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.999633286
R Square 0.999266706
Adjusted R Square 0.998900059
Standard Error 0.40796829
Observations 4
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept -1.983608324 0.437267461 -4.53637305
X Variable 1 0.105923624 0.002028973 52.2055426
Table 4-19 Resulting intercept and slope with statistical test results of the mean unfavorite airline
disutility, for leisure passengers
As in the business passenger case, the significant R square value is over 99%, and t-
statistics are large enough for both the intercept and slope coefficients. The intercept of
the leisure unfavorite airline disutility function is -1.98 with a slope of 0.11.
4.3.2.3. Path Quality Index Disutility, For Business Passenger
Deriving the intercept and slope coefficients for the path quality index disutility function
follows the same steps as in the unfavorite airline disutility described in Section 4.3.2.1.
The only difference is that the path quality index disutility function applies for unit PQI.
For example, the survey is asking the disutility of a connecting path, which has PQI of 3
(equation 4-8). In this case, the total PQI disutility would be the sum of three unit PQI
disutility distributions. With two path choices of (non-stop, fare class 1) and (connecting,
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fare class 2), the "total cost calculation table" in this case for a market distance of 500
miles is constructed as shown in Table 4-20.
Non-stop, Fare class 31 Connecting, Fare class 4
Unfavorite Airline? No No
Path Quality Index 1 (non-stop) 3 (connecting)
Replanning? No No
Nominal Fare $350 $175
Restriction Disutility $0 $x
UFA Disutility $0 $0
PQI Disutility $z $3z
Rpin Disutility $0 $0
Total Cost I 350+z I 175+x+3z
Table 4-20 Total cost calculation table for two path options
With the total cost for each path option calculated as in Table 4-20, the survey question is
interpreted in mathematical form as follows:
Pr(350+ z > 175+ x+3z)= Pr(x+2z < 175) =0.723 (4.27)
Equations (4.18)-(4.20), which are for the conditional disutility for restriction 1, can be
applied for our variable x in Equation (4.27).
1f x)= *60.356
1 *
2T *59.06
exp( -(x -196.88)
2
2 *59.062
E(x) = Jx * f (x)dx = $134.84
a(x) = E(x 2 ) -{E(x)}2 = $32.09
I (4.18)
(4.19)
(4.20)
Let the mean unit PQI disutility cost be pPQ1,B,500mi , and let the standard deviation be
aPQI,B,500mi . Then, the probability density function for unit PQI is expressed as equation
(4.28).
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f(z) = N(p PQI,B,500 mi PQI,B,500mi 2), where UPQI,B,500mi = kPQJIB,500mi 9k = 0.3 (4.28)
Again, as in Section 4.3.2.1, let x+2z=w and assume x to have a Gaussian distribution.
Then, the variable w will also have a normal distribution with mean and standard
deviation of:
E(w) = E(x)+2E(z) = 13 4 .8 4 +2pPQI,B,500mi (4.29)
U(w) = {a(x)} 2 +2{a(z)} 2 = j32.092 +2(0.3UFA,B, 5 00 mi ) 2  (4.30)
The next step is to solve the equation (4.31) for pPQI,B,500mi '
P(w > 175) = P Z > = 0.723 (4.31)
This equation gives the result pPQI,B,500mi $30.31
Similar calculations give the mean disutility cost for market distances of 1000, 2000, and
4000 miles. The calculated mean unit PQI disutility cost and business passenger
basefares for those markets are shown in Table 4-21.
Market Distance(mi) 500 1000 2000 4000
BasefareBusiness $218.75 $312.50 $500.00 $875.00
Mean UFA Disutility $30.31 $34.78 $43.70 $63.05
Table 4-21 Mean PQI disutility cost, for business passengers
Table 4-22 summarizes the results of linear regression over four data points. Consistent
with the previous results, the regression produces a high R square value over 99% and
significant t-statistics. The obtained intercept and slope for business PQI disutility
function are 19.15 and 0.05.
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Regression
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Squar
Standard Error
Statistics
0.999783877
0.999567802
e 0.999351702
0.369253679
Observations 4
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 19.15121462 0.395772472 48.38945595
X Variable 1 0.049959046 0.000734572 68.01105472
Table 4-22 Resulting intercept and slope of mean PQI disutility with statistical test results for
business passengers
4.3.2.4. Path Quality Index Disutility, For Leisure Passengers
With calculations similar to those in Section 4.3.2.2, Table 4-23 give the mean leisure
PQI disutility costs. The following Table 4-24 shows statistics and the values of intercept
and slope, assuring statistical significance.
Market Distance(mi)
BasefareLeisure
Mean PQI Disutility
500
$87.50
$6.16
1000
$125.00
$8.37
2000
$200.00
$12.69
4000
$350.00
$37.34
Table 4-23 Mean PQI disutility cost for leisure passengers
I
Regression
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
Statistics
0.999986283
0.999972567
0.99995885
0.043698924
4
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 1.011066002 0.046837262 21.58678703
X Variable 1 0.058680237 0.00021733 270.0046874
Table 4-24 Resulting intercept and slope of mean PQI disutility with statistical test results for leisure
passengers
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4.3.2.5. Replanning Disutility, For Business Passengers
The same calculations as in the unfavorite airline example give mean leisure PQI
disutility costs, as in Table 4-25. The following table, 4-26, displays statistics and values
of the intercept and slope, assuring statistical significance.
Market Distance(mi) 500 1000 2000 4000
BasefareBusiness $218.75 $312.50 $500.00 $875.00
Mean RpIn Disutility $56.07 $69.96 $102.14 $152.29
Table 4-25 Mean replanning disutility cost for business passengers
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.999705669
R Square 0.999411424
Adjusted R Square 0.999117137
Standard Error 1.362987046
Observations 4
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 21.56292485 1.460873061 14.76030015
X Variable 1 0.158011092 0.00271145 58.27550538
Table 4-26 Resulting intercept and slope of replanning airline disutility with statistical test results for
business passengers
4.3.2.6. Replanning Disutility, For Leisure Passengers
Mean leisure PQI disutility costs are calculated in Table 4-27. Table 4-28 shows statistics
and values of the intercept and slope, assuring statistical significance.
Market Distance(mi) 500 1000 2000 4000
BasefareLeisure $87.50 $125.00 $200.00 $350.00
Mean Rpin Disutility $6.16 $8.37 $12.69 $37.34
Table 4-27 Mean replanning disutility cost for leisure passengers
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Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.999975051
R Square 0.999950103
Adjusted R Square 0.999925154
Standard Error 0.101687371
Observations 4
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 1.900849536 0.108990281 17.44054171
X Variable 1 0.101247346 0.000505728 200.2012665
Table 4-28 Resulting intercept and slope of mean replanning disutility for leisure passengers
4.3.3. Summary
Table 4-29 summarizes the resulting intercepts and slopes of the disutilities for each
passenger type. Figure 4-2 and 4-3 plots the mean disutilities and shows the regression
line as a function of distance for each disutility.
Type Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept | Slope
Businessl -12.29 m0.17 19.15 of0.05 c i21.56 u0.16
Leisure 1-1.98 0.11 1.01 0.06 1.9 0. 1
Table 4-29 Sununary of coefficients for all disutility functions
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Figure 4-3 Mean disutility costs by market basefares business passengers
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Figure 4-4 Mean disutility costs by market basefare leisure passengers
Figures 4-3 and 4-4 depict the average disutility cost for three disutility categories over
market basefares. The PQI disutility costs were plotted for 2*PQI disutility cost instead
of unit disutility cost, since the perceived difference of disutility costs between nonstop
and a connecting path is 2*PQI. With these three disutilities plotted on the same scale, we
are able to weigh the relative importance of each disutility in passenger choice.
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From Figure 4-3 for business passengers, we observe that the replanning disutility is the
highest among the three disutility categories for most of the markets. Replanning the
whole trip would be more painful than taking an unfavorite airline or one-stop path. For
short haul markets with under 1000 miles range, path quality disutility cost for
connecting markets are even higher than the replanning disutility cost, implying that the
path quality is most important criteria among these three disutility categories for those
markets. For leisure passengers the replanning disutility cost is consistently the highest
cost disutility among the three categories followed by the path quality disutility, as shown
in Figure 4-4. Generally, all three disutilities show an increasing trend as market distance
increases.
4.4. Summary
In this chapter we introduced disutility functions and inspected how disutility functions
apply within PODS 8 Passenger Assignment Model. Basically, disutility functions
implemented in PODS require intercept and slope since they are expressed as a linear
function of market basefare. These parameters were estimated from the survey conducted
of airline experts. The coefficients of the disutility functions extracted and estimated from
the survey will serve as input parameters indicating the impact of each disutility
component on passengers' path choice. The following chapters present the results of
PODS simulations with disutility function coefficients applied.
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Chapter 5 Simulation Results
In Chapter 4 we estimated the coefficients for the three disutility functions - unfavorite
airline, path quality index, and replanning. These coefficients determine the effects of
each disutility component on passenger's path choice, and therefore have an influence on
the performance of various revenue management methods. In this chapter we examine the
results of the PODS simulation with all four disutility functions implemented.
Section 5.1 is an explanation of the base case settings and some of the important input
parameters for the PODS simulation. Section 5.2 presents the simulation results with all
disutility functions, with estimated coefficients as simulation input, followed by
interpretation in Section 5.3 and a chapter summary in Section 5.4.
5.1. Base Case Settings
Before presenting any of the simulation results, it is necessary to understand the base case
that serves as a basis for comparison of simulations performed for this thesis. Since the
purpose of the simulations presented in this thesis is to observe the impacts of disutility
components, we set up our base case such that three disutility costs of our interest have
either zero or constant values. Additionally, our base case will be reflecting the most
common revenue management conditions (including forecasting and detruncation) that
the majority of the airlines in the world operate under. All simulations addressed in this
thesis were performed on Network D, which is described in Section 3.4.
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5.1.1. Disutility Functions
The four disutility components that we can manipulate in PODS simulations are
restriction disutilities, unfavorite airline disutilities, path quality index disutilities, and
replanning disutilities. All disutility functions are set as a linear function of the market
basefares. Recall from Section 4.1.3 that market basefares are an index fare that indicates
fare levels of markets. Among the four disutility functions, we adapt restriction disutility
function coefficients from Wilson [14]. Table 4-2 shows the coefficients for three
restrictions used in PODS. Definitions of the three restrictions and their relation to fare
classes were illustrated in Table 4-1 and Section 4.1.3.1. The base case disutility
functions for three disutility components of our interest and related parameters are set as
follows:
Unfavorite Airline Disutility Function: Unfavorite airline disutility function
coefficients are all set to zero for the base case, hence it is assumed that passenger's
airline preference does not influence path choice.
Airline Preference Coefficients: We assume that both airlines are equally preferred.
That is, half of the passengers in the network prefer Airline A to Airline B, and visa
versa. In our simulation inputs the airline preference coefficients for both airlines are set
to be 0.5, each.
Replanning Disutility Function: Similarly, replanning disutility function coefficients
have zero values in order to initially assume that passengers choose paths outside his/her
decision window without any kind of penalty for those paths.
Path Quality Index Disutility Function: For minimum discrepancy between nonstop
and connecting paths, we used an initial intercept value of $25 for unit Path Quality
Index. However with base case slope for PQI disutility function set to zero, all unit PQI
disutility costs are assumed to have constant value of $25 for all markets. With PQI=3 for
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connecting paths and PQI=1 for nonstop paths, the constant difference in PQI disutility
costs between a connection and nonstop will be $50.
5.1.2. Revenue Management
We will be testing the impact of passenger disutilities, when airlines are using one of the
six revenue management methods (EMSRb, GVN, Netbid, DAVN, HBP and ProBP)
introduced in Section 3.1 and 3.2. The leg-based EMSRb model serves as a base case
revenue management method for all simulations presented in this thesis. Especially, the
revenue gains achieved with O-D revenue management are measured as a percentage
gain over the case when both airlines use EMSRb control.
5.1.3. Forecasting and Detruncation
Forecasting in the airline management world is predicting the demand for future flights
given booking histories of previous flights. However, since "closed flights" exist which
had demand exceeding the capacity of the flight, the number of bookings from a closed
flight is different from actual demand for the flight. Therefore the number of bookings
from the past flights is biased to lower values than actual demands, and airlines need to
remove the bias (or unconstrain) of historical data. This process is called detruncation.
Hence forecasting actually consists of two phases, detruncation of historical data and
application of forecasting models. Some sophisticated models exist for forecasting and
detruncation2 2 , but since forecasting and detruncation is not a major focus of this thesis,
we limit the forecasting and detruncation methods to basic models used in PODS.
Detruncation - Booking Curve Detruncation
Booking Curve detruncation uses booking curves from unclosed flights as a reference for
future demands. This method simply uses the estimates from the unclosed flights to
22 For deeper inspections on forecasting and detruncation methods, refer to Gorin [9].
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predict how many more people will book from a certain time point on. For example, if
the estimated bookings 14 days prior to departure from unclosed flights are 40% of the
total bookings (hence total demand in the cased of unclosed flights), and we have 40
passengers booked 14 days prior to departure for a future flight, the estimated
unconstrained historical demand for this flight will be 100 bookings.
Forecasting - Pick-up Forecasting
Pick-up forecasting in method is similar to Booking Curve detruncation, but more time-
specific. That is, pick-up forecasting estimates the number of passengers "picked up"
(additionally booked) from a time period to the next. Hence to get a forecast of
incremental bookings from a current time period, pick-up forecasting uses the average of
number of incremental bookings for that specific time period from previous open flights.
Depending on the revenue management method, pick-up forecasting is done on a leg or
ODF basis, and also revised at every time frame.
5.1.4. Demand Factors
Demand factor in PODS is the ratio of average demand over average aircraft capacity.
For example, at demand factor of 0.9, the average demand for a flight where a 100 seat
capacity aircraft flies will be 90 passengers. The simulations performed for this thesis are
done on a four demand factor level: demand factor (DF) 0.8, 0.9, 1.0 and 1.1.
Approximately, with both airlines using EMSRb control, with base case disutility
parameters, the average system-wide load factors at those demand factorare 70%, 78%,
84% and 88% at DF 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, and 1.1, respectively. The average system-wide load
factors broken down by banks are shown in Table 5-1.
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ALF 70% 78% 84% 88%
Bank 1 64% 74% 82% 88%
Bank 2 78% 83% 86% 89%
Bank 3 69% 76% 83% 87%
Table 5-1 Base case average system-wide load factors at four demand factors, both airlines using
EMSRb control
5.2. Simulation Results with Disutilities
5.2.1. Settings
Input settings for simulations with disutilities are exactly the same as the base case,
except that we use disutility functions extracted from the survey (Section 4.3, Table 4-29)
to characterize unfavorite airline, path quality index, and replanning disutilities of
passengers. Again airline A uses all six revenue management methods described in
Section 3.1 and 3.2, whereas airline B keeps using EMSRb control in all cases.
5.2.2. Results
Revenue Gains
With the estimated disutility functions in the simulation, DAVN followed by ProBP
shows the largest revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb case for all demand factors.
The relative rankings of O-D methods agree with the base case disutility parameters. O-D
methods that performed worse than EMSRb at base case show positive revenue gains in
disutility simulation, benefiting from stronger passenger path preferences.
Revenue gains for airline A using O-D methods, increase over the base case with all
disutility functions implemented. At all demand factors, DAVN and ProBP show the
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largest increase in revenue gains, implying these methods with path forecasting are more
effective under stronger passenger path preferences. Netbid, which suffered with negative
revenue gains, shows slightly positive revenue gains when disutility parameters are
included. Figures 5-1 to 5-4 illustrate the competitive revenue gain increases when
disutility parameters are introduced, for demand factors 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, and 1.1.
Network D Revenue Gains With Disutilities vs. Base Case
Airline A, Network ALF=70% (DF 0.8)
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Figure 5-1 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with disutility functions vs. base case, DF 0.8
At DF 0.8, all revenue management methods show increased revenue gains when
disutility functions are applied in the simulation. Netbid, which showed negative revenue
gains in the base case, shows positive revenue gains with input disutilities. DAVN and
ProBP perform the best among the O-D methods.
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Network D Revenue Gains With Disutilities vs. Base Case
Airline A, Network ALF=78% (DF 0.9)
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Figure 5-2 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with disutility functions vs. base case, DF 0.9
At DF 0.9, the relative rankings of O-D methods do not change from the base case. Again
DAVN and ProBP show the best performance, ProBP catching up with DAVN revenue
gains when disutilities are applied. ProBP, DAVN, and Netbid show the highest increases
in percentage revenue gains from the base case.
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Network D Revenue Gains With Disutilities vs. Base Case
Airline A, Network ALF=84% (DF 1.0)
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Figure 5-3 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with disutility functions vs. base case, DF 1.0
At DF 1.0, the discrepancies between the O-D methods start to grow larger.
Significantly, DAVN, ProBP, and Netbid show gains with passenger disutilities included,
whereas GVN and HBP do not show as much increase in revenue gains over the base
case. Still HBP performs better than Netbid, as in the base case.
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Network D Revenue Gains With Disutilities vs. Base Case
Airline A, Network ALF=88% (DF 1.1)
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Figure 5-4 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with disutility functions vs. base case, DF 1.1
DAVN consistently shows the highest revenue gains both in the base case and with
disutilities. As in other demand factors, DAVN, ProBP, and Netbid benefit the most from
passenger disutilities at DF 1.1.
Loads
Average network load factors, which are the total Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM)
divided by total Available Seat Miles (ASM), generally increase up to 1% when the
disutility costs are accounted for. Especially at lower demand levels where there is more
opportunity for improvement of inventory control, these increase rates are higher. Airline
A with EMSRb control achieves 0.9% higher load factors at DF 0.8, than the base case
without any disutilities considered. At DF 0.9, 1.0, and 1.1, this increase reduces to
0.75%, 0.39%, and 0.15%. Generally more sophisticated O-D control methods such as
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DAVN, HBP, and ProBP which already carried more passengers at base case benefit less
than EMSRb. At DF 1.1 where load mix becomes more important in terms of revenue
gains rather than absolute load factors, some of these methods end up carrying less
passengers than the base case, implying more strict O-D control for better fare mix. GVN
and Netbid generally show the highest increase in load factors with disutility parameters
included. Table 5-2 illustrates the simulation results in terms of average network load
factors for all demand factors.
YM methods With Disutility Base Case Difference
DF Airline A Airline B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B
.... EMSRb EMSRb 70.97 69.6 70.07 69.73 0.9 -0.13
GVN EMSRb 71.27 69.49 70.33 69.68 0.94 -0.19
Netbid EMSRb 71.39 69.38 70.4 69.64 0.99 -0.26
DAVN EMSRb 71.25 69.46 70.37 69.63 0.88 -0.17
.... HBP EMSRb 71.08 69.59 70.23 69.74 0.85 -0.15
ProBP EMSRb 71.18 69.53 70.28 69.67 0.9 -0.14
09 EMSRb EMSRb 77.87 76.88 77.12 76.89 0.75 -0.01
GVN EMSRb 78.77 76.61 77.92 76.97 0.85 -0.36
Netbid EMSRb 79.28 76.32 78.35 76.7 0.93 -0.38
DAVN EMSRb 78.87 76.48 78.11 76.83 0.76 -0.35
0 HBP EMSRb 78.38 76.79 77.68 76.97 0.7 -0.18
ProBP EMSRb 78.63 76.66 77.93 76.71 0.7 -0.05
I... EMSRb EMSRb 82.81 82.17 82.42 82.28 0.39 -0.11
GVN EMSRb 84.23 81.55 83.81 82.33 0.42 -0.78
SNetbid EMSRb 85.46 81.3 85.07 81.82 0.39 -0.52
DAVN EMSRb 84.41 81.55 84.15 82.02 0.26 -0.47
HBP EMSRb 83.79 81.91 83.46 82.34 0.33 -0.43
ProBP EMSRb 84.14 81.8 83.92 81.9 0.22 -0.1
1 EMSRb EMSRb 86.1 85.75 85.95 85.9 0.15 -0.15
GVN EMSRb 87.75 85 87.58 85.79 0.17 -0.79
Netbid EMSRb 89.81 84.71 89.73 85.22 0.08 -0.51
DAVN EMSRb 87.91 85.17 87.95 85.63 -0.04 -0.46
HBP EMSRb 87.36 85.43 87.17 85.93 0.19 -0.5
ProBP EMSRb 87.59 85.41 87.6 85.45 -0.01 -0.04
Table 5-2 Average network load factors at all demand factors, for simulations with disutilities and
base case
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Loads by Fare Class
As we saw in the average load factor results, the general trend with disutility costs
considered is increase in load factors. Generally the incremental loads by fare class are in
the same range for all revenue management methods, implying that additional passengers
are results of stronger path preference (since disutility costs are considered) rather than
discrepancies of revenue management methods. This is true especially at lower demands,
where flights are more open and the role of seat inventory control are not as important as
in higher demand factors.
At a relatively high demand of DF 1.0, we observe loss of passengers in Q class (Figure
5-8) whereas Y class continues to carry more passengers (Figure 5-5). In conclusion, with
disutility costs, the path preference of passengers result in "better" seat inventory control
to lead to higher load factors and better fare mix. Figures 5-5 to 5-8 show the average
loads by fare class for all simulations at DF 1.0.
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Figure 5-5 Average Y class loads for airline A, at DF
case
1.0, for simulations with disutilities and base
Airline A B Class Loads at DF 1.0
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Figure 5-6 Average B class loads for airline A, at DF 1.0, for simulations with disutilities and base
case
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Airline A Y Class Loads at DF 1.0
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Figure 5-7 Average M class loads for airline A, at DF 1.0, for simulations with disuilities and base
case
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Figure 5-8 Average Q class loads for airline A, at DF
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1.0, for simulations with disutilities and base
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5.3. Discussions
As we observed in Section 5.2.2, the performances of O-D revenue management methods
as well as EMSRb improve when we account for passenger disutilities. When passenger
disutilities are implemented in the simulation, the passenger preference for "popular"
paths becomes stronger, resulting in higher demands for some paths and lower demands
for others, compared to the base case. Hence the role of revenue management becomes
more important than the base case, and this is proven by the higher revenue gains of O-D
methods. The increases in absolute revenues as well as revenue gains are results of higher
load factors. This is a combined effect of both higher demands with disutilities, and better
fare mix.
5.4. Summary
In this chapter we inspected the simulation results with all disutility parameters defmed
as the estimated values obtained from the survey, as well as the base case for comparison
of results. We saw that in general all revenue management methods are more effective
when passengers have stronger preferences for better quality paths. In the next chapter we
present simulation results for individual disutility components, to find out the impacts of
each component separately.
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Chapter 6 Sensitivity Analysis
In Chapter 5, we examined the results from simulations with all disutility components
applied, and found out that the benefits of revenue management become greater in that
case. In order to find out the sensitivity of each disutility component in those results,
simulations were performed separately with each disutility component. In this chapter we
examine and analyze the impact of each disutility component through sensitivity
simulations.
6.1. Unfavorite Airline Disutility
6.1.1. Settings
The settings for unfavorite airline disutility simulations are the same as the base case
described in Section 5.1, except that the disutility parameters for unfavorite airline
disutility functions (both business and leisure) are specified by the survey results. Hence
in this simulation we are assuming that along with restrictions, the preference for carrier
is the only factor that has influence over passengers' path preference. Airline preference
factors for both airlines (the probability that a passenger will prefer the given airline) are
set to be 0.5.
94
6.1.2. Results
Revenue Gains
The simulations with estimated unfavorite airline disutility costs show interesting results.
First of all, among the O-D methods tested, only Netbid and ProBP show higher revenue
gains than the base case. Secondly, Netbid performs even better than under the case when
all disutilities are accounted for, implying that the deterministic network bid price
optimization method is most sensitive to airline preference factors. Something else that is
noticeable is that DAVN performs better than the base case in most of the cases, except at
DF 0.9. Overall, O-D methods under low demand levels do not perform as well as the
base case (without disutilities included), or slightly better. However, as demand grows
higher, DF 1.0 or 1.1, all O-D methods start to show higher revenue gains than the base
case, and even better than the case with all disutilities at DF 1.1. Hence we can say that
the performances of revenue management methods under unfavorite airline disutility
costs are very sensitive to demand levels.
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Airline A Revenue Gains with Unfavorite Airline Disutility
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Figure 6-1 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with unfavorite airline disutility vs. base case,
DF 0.8
At DF 0.8, Netbid, with its "open" bid-price mechanism, outperforms base case revenue
gains as well as revenue gains with all disutilities. DAVN and ProBP show robust
performance with unfavorite airline disutilities. GVN and HBP both show negative
revenue gains under unfavorite airline disutilities.
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Airline A Revenue Gains with Unfavorite Airline Disutility
Airline A Revenue Gains with Unfavorite Airline Disutility
DF 0.9
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Figure 6-2 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with unfavorite airline disutility vs. base case,
DF 0.9
Revenue gains of O-D methods at DF 0.9 show similar trends as in DF 0.8. The notable
difference is that HBP now turns over to positive revenue gains due to increased demand,
whereas GVN still records negative revenue gains with its "greediness".
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Figure 6-3 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with unfavorite airline disutility vs. base case,
DF 1.0
At DF 1.0, ProBP starts to outperform other O-D revenue management methods. HBP,
GVN and DAVN catch up with base case revenue gains, whereas Netbid shows higher
revenue gains than the base case.
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Airline A Revenue Gains with Unfavorite Airline Disutility
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Figure 6-4 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with unfavorite airline disutility vs. base case,
DF 1.1
At the highest demand level, DF 1.1, all bid-price methods do better than the base case,
and even better than the all-disutilities simulations. DAVN also performs better than the
base case, almost to the level where all disutilities are implemented. Overall, all O-D
methods under unfavorite airlines are able to perform better at higher demand factors.
Loads
Average network load factors for airline A with unfavorite airline disutilities are higher
than the base case, up to 1.7% at DF 0.8 for GVN. Airline B also records higher load
factors than the base case, indicating that the there are network-wide increases in
demand. EMSRb shows the highest increase in load factors with unfavorite airline
disutilities from the base case, hence the relative increase in loads for O-D methods are
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negligible or negative compared to EMSRb. This explains some of the O-D method
revenue gains, which are lower than the base case.
YM methods With UFA Disutilit Base Case Difference
DF Airline A Airline B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B
Q ~EMSRb EMSRb 71.65 71.78 70.07 69.73 1.58 2.05
GVN EMSRb 72.01 71.4 70.33 69.68 1.68 1.72
Netbid EMSRb 71.93 71.44 70.4 69.64 1.53 1.8
DAVN EMSRb 71.81 71.56 70.37 69.63 1.44 1.93
HBP EMSRb 71.82 71.58 70.23 69.74 1.59 1.84
ProBP EMSRb 71.91 71.48 70.28 69.67 1.63 1.81
EMSRb EMSRb 78.37 78.67 77.12 76.89 1.25 1.78
GVN EMSRb 78.97 78.24 77.92 76.97 1.05 1.27
Netbid EMSRb 79.51 77.86 78.35 76.7 1.16 1.16
DAVN EMSRb 79.24 78.09 78.11 76.83 1.13 1.26
HBP EMSRb 78.77 78.39 77.68 76.97 1.09 1.42
ProBP EMSRb 79.07 78.22 77.93 76.71 1.14 1.51
EMSRb EMSRb 83.38 83.65 82.42 82.28 0.96 1.37
GVN EMSRb 84.37 83.2 83.81 82.33 0.56 0.87
Netbid EMSRb 85.73 82.53 85.07 81.82 0.66 0.71
DAVN EMSRb 85.17 82.74 84.15 82.02 1.02 0.72
HBP EMSRb 84.11 83.3 83.46 82.34 0.65 0.96
ProBP EMSRb 84.59 83.06 83.92 81.9 0.67 1.16
EMSRb EMSRb 86.79 85.17 85.95 85.9 0.84 -0.73
GVN EMSRb 88.07 84.11 87.58 85.79 0.49 -1.68
Netbid EMSRb 90.13 84.59 89.73 85.22 0.4 -0.63
DAVN EMSRb 89 86.79 87.95 85.63 1.05 1.16
HBP EMSRb 87.73 88.07 87.17 85.93 0.56 2.14
. ...... ProBP EMSRb 88.09 90.13 87.6 85.45 0.49 4.68
Table 6-1 Average network load factors at all demand factors, for simulations with unfavorite airline
disutilities and base case
Discussions
When unfavorite airline disutilities are implemented, half of the flights operating within
the network are less attractive to passengers, due to the 0.5 airline preference factor.
Hence when compared to the base case, passengers are more reluctant to fly on an
unfavorite airline, causing more passengers to spill from the favorite airline, or to sell-up
to a higher fare class. Since there is more willingness to sell-up, the relative benefits of
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O-D revenue management methods tend to be higher than base case. This effect is
maximized at higher demand levels, where "optimal" fare mix becomes an important
factor in revenue benefits. At lower demands, revenue gains for O-D revenue
management methods are not as significant since flights are more open and revenue
increase for FCYM is in a similar range with O-D methods. One more thing worth noting
is that the average load factors under unfavorite airline disutilities are larger compared to
all disutility simulations, up to 1.63%. This can be explained by the fact that with
considerable preference for a favorite airline and at the same time without any
preferences or disutilities for path quality, the demand for a connecting path offered by a
favorite airline becomes higher (at the same time demand for nonstop path offered by
unfavorite airline is lower) than without any disutilities. Hence increased loads for
connecting path results in higher RPMs, leading to higher load factors in the unfavorite
airline disutility simulations.
6.2. Path Quality Index Disutility
6.2.1. Settings
Disutility parameters for PQI disutility in the simulations use estimated coefficients from
the survey, for both business and leisure passengers. Hence in this simulation we are
assuming that along with restrictions, the path quality (indicating whether the path is non-
stop or connecting) is the only factor that has influence over passengers' path preference.
PODS defines the PQI of a nonstop path to be 1, and connecting PQI to be 3. All PQJ
disutility costs chosen from the Gaussian distribution are multiplied by PQI to obtain PQI
disutility costs, as described in Section 4.1.3.3.
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6.2.2. Results
Revenue Gains
Revenue gains for O-D methods with PQI disutilities are not very different from revenue
gains from the base case. GVN, DAVN and ProBP show similar ranges of revenue gains
with the base case, for all demand factors. HBP does not perform as well as the base case,
falling short of 0.05~0.26%. Netbid performs slightly better than the base case, except at
DF 1.0. In most cases the revenue gains are not higher than the base case.
Airline A Revenue Gains with PQI Disutility, DF 0.8
1.5%-
BAll Disutilities
MPQ1 Disutility
ElBase Case
1.0%
aO0.5%-
0.25%0 0.26%0.20% / ..
.05%% 0.03%
0.0% -.
GVN .Neid05% DAVN HBP ProBP
-0.5% - - - - - - - - - - - --......................----- - -- - --- --------------------- --- --------................................................--------.-----.-----------.--.----------------
Figure 6-5 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with PQI disutility vs. base case, DF 0.8
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All O-D method revenue gains are similar to the base case revenue gains at DF 0.8. With
low demand, PQI disutility has very little impact on the relative revenue benefits of O-D
methods.
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Figure 6-6 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with PQI disutility vs. base case, DF 0.9
Revenue gains under PQI disutilities at DF 0.9 show similar patterns with revenue gains
at DF 0.8. The notable difference is that HBP now falls short of base case revenue gains
with PQI disutilities.
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Airline A Revenue Gains with PQI Disutility, DF 0.9
Figure 6-7 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with PQI disutility vs. base case, DF 1.0
As demand grows higher, the difference between HBP revenue gain with PQI disutility
and under base case grows, at DF 1.0. Other O-D methods still show similar performance
compared with the base case.
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Airline A Revenue Gains with PQI Disutility, DF 1.1
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Figure 6-8 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with PQI disutility vs. base case, DF 1.1
At the highest demand factor of 1.1, GVN and Netbid show 0.05% recovery from the
negative revenue gains they recorded in the base case, but still show negative revenue
gains. HBP continues to fall short of the base case revenue gains, whereas DAVN and
ProBP consistently show similar revenue gains with the base case.
Loads
The average network load factors for PQI disutility simulations are also almost the same
as the load factors in the base case. The differences between the base case load factors
and PQI disutility simulation load factors are less than 0.1%, indicating that PQI disutility
in Network D has little impact on loads, for all O-D methods.
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YM methods With PQI Disutilit Base Case Difference
DF Airline A Airline B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B
EMSRb EMSRb 70.09 69.71 70.07 69.73 0.02 -0.02
GVN EMSRb 70.35 69.66 70.33 69.68 0.02 -0.02
Netbid EMSRb 70.41 69.62 70.4 69.64 0.01 -0.02
DAVN EMSRb 70.33 69.63 70.37 69.63 -0.04 0
HBP EMSRb 70.23 69.72 70.23 69.74 0 -0.02
ProBP EMSRb 70.3 69.65 70.28 69.67 0.02 -0.02
EMSRb EMSRb 77.18 76.94 77.12 76.89 0.06 0.05
GVN EMSRb 77.99 77.02 77.92 76.97 0.07 0.05
Netbid EMSRb 78.42 76.74 78.35 76.7 0.07 0.04
DAVN EMSRb 78.1 76.83 78.11 76.83 -0.01 0
HBP EMSRb 77.7 76.98 77.68 76.97 0.02 0.01
ProBP EMSRb 77.99 76.75 77.93 76.71 0.06 0.04
I e. EMSRb EMSRb 82.4 82.25 82.42 82.28 -0.02 -0.03
. GVN EMSRb 83.79 82.31 83.81 82.33 -0.02 -0.02
Netbid EMSRb 85.05 81.81 85.07 81.82 -0.02 -0.01
DAVN EMSRb 84.15 82.01 84.15 82.02 0 -0.01
HBP EMSRb 83.44 82.27 83.46 82.34 -0.02 -0.07
SProBP EMSRb 83.9 81.88 83.92 81.9 -0.02 -0.02
X EMSRb EMSRb 85.97 85.9 85.95 85.9 0.02 0
GVN EMSRb 87.59 85.79 87.58 85.79 0.01 0
Netbid EMSRb 89.74 85.24 89.73 85.22 0.01 0.02
DAVN EMSRb 87.93 85.61 87.95 85.63 -0.02 -0.02
HBP EMSRb 87.27 85.88 87.17 85.93 0.1 -0.05
ProBP EMSRb 87.62 85.45 87.6 85.45 0.02 0
Table 6-2 Average network load factors at all demand factors, for simulations with PQI disutilities
and base case
Discussions
Basically we observe that with only PQI disutilities included in the simulation, the results
are very close to the base case. This is mainly because the PQI disutilities in our Network
D only affect "local" markets2 3, which has both nonstop and connecting path options for
the same market. All other markets have only connecting path options with single
connections (spoke-to-spoke markets) or only nonstop path options (interhub markets),
therefore PQI disutility costs have no impact on passengers' path choice. Hence even
23 Spoke-to-hub markets. Passengers have the choice of a nonstop flight by a hub-dominating carrier or a
connecting flight offered by the other carrier on these local markets.
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though PQI disutility costs have relatively high values compared to other disutility costs
(see Figure 4-3 and 4-4), the effective impact on the whole network is not as large.
In most cases, revenue gains of O-D methods are slightly smaller or similar to the base
case. This is explainable by the fact that the revenue increase of EMSRb algorithm with
FCYM overrules the relative benefits of O-D revenue management methods.
6.3. Replanning Disutility
A
6.3.1. Settings
Simulations for replanning disutility sensitivity tests use parameters from the base case,
with replanning disutility function coefficients from the survey, for both business and
leisure passengers. Hence in this simulation we are assuming that along with restrictions,
the replanning disutility (indicating whether the path is within passengers' decision
window or not) is the only factor that has influence over passengers' path preference.
6.3.2. Results
Revenue Gains
Revenue gains of O-D method in all replanning disutility simulations show higher values
than the base case revenue gains. Especially at lower demand levels, at DF 0.8 and DF
0.9, the revenue gains are even higher than simulations with all disutilities. GVN
achieves the highest revenue gains with replanning disutilities only. DAVN and ProBP
consistently record the highest revenue gains among the O-D methods, and at the same
time consistently perform better than the base case, similar to revenue gains with all
disutilities. HBP revenue gains are in a similar range to the base case and all disutility
simulations.
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Figure 6-9 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with replanning disutility vs. base case, DF 0.8
All O-D revenue gains are higher than the base case at DF 0.8, and even higher than
simulations with all disutilities. Especially revenue management methods with path-based
forecasting, DAVN and ProBP show the highest revenue gains, improving up to 0.18%
from the base case revenue gains.
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Figure 6-10 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with replanning disutility vs. base case, DF 0.9
At DF 0.9, DAVN achieves the highest revenue gains followed by ProBP. Still all O-D
methods outperform both the base case and all-disutility revenue gains. HBP performs
about the same for all three cases.
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Figure 6-11 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with replanning disutility vs. base case, DF 10
At DF 1.0, revenue gains for DAVN, ProBP, and HBP catch up with revenue gains for
the simulations with all disutilities. However GVN revenue gain difference is not as
noticeable. Netbid revenue gain falls in between the base case and all-disutility revenue
gains, with a slightly negative value.
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Figure 6-12 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, with replanning disutility vs. base case, DF 1.1
At DF 1.1, the trends of revenue gains for replanning disutility simulations are almost the
same as DF 1.0. All O-D revenue gains, with exception of Netbid, are in the same range
as revenue gains under all disutilities, indicating that replanning disutilities have the
largest impact among the three disutilities.
Loads
Average network load factors of airline A are generally higher with replanning disutilities
than the base case. Moreover, when airline A uses O-D method incremental airline A
load factors are higher than EMSRb, whereas airline B loses more passengers. This result
indicates that the increase in load factors (and revenues) for airline A are mostly due to
O-D method benefits, rather than replanning disutility itself. Also the load factor values
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are close to those of all-disutility simulations, also showing that replanning disutilities
have greatest impact among the three disutilities when all disutilities are installed in the
simulation.
YM methods With RPN Disutilit Base Case Difference
DF Airline A Airline B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B ALF A ALF B
EMSRb EMSRb 70.45 68.72 70.07 69.73 0.38 -1.01
GVN EMSRb 70.88 68.53 70.33 69.68 0.55 -1.15
Netbid EMSRb 71.01 68.42 70.4 69.64 0.61 -1.22
DAVN EMSRb 70.87 66.81 70.37 69.63 0.5 -2.82
HBP EMSRb 70.64 68.7 70.23 69.74 0.41 -1.04
ProBP EMSRb 70.74 68.62 70.28 69.67 0.46 -1.05
EMSRb EMSRb 77.38 76.18 77.12 76.89 0.26 -0.71
GVN EMSRb 78.4 76.03 77.92 76.97 0.48 -0.94
Netbid EMSRb 78.94 75.63 78.35 76.7 0.59 -1.07
DAVN EMSRb 78.57 75.82 78.11 76.83 0.46 -1.01
HBP EMSRb 77.99 76.17 77.68 76.97 0.31 -0.8
ProBP EMSRb 78.31 75.96 77.93 76.71 0.38 -0.75
EMSRb EMSRb 82.46 81.72 82.42 82.28 0.04 -0.56
S GVN EMSRb 83.97 81.37 83.81 82.33 0.16 -0.96
55Netbid EMSRb 85.32 80.94 85.07 81.82 0.25 -0.88
55DAVN EMSRb 84.27 81.22 84.15 82.02 0.12 -0.8
SHBP EMSRb 83.55 81.62 83.46 82.34 0.09 -0.72
ProBP EMSRb 84.04 81.32 83.92 81.9 0.12 -0.58
II EMSRb EMSRb 85.93 85.52 85.95 85.9 -0.02 -0.38
GVN EMSRb 87.59 84.96 87.58 85.79 0.01 -0.83
Netbid EMSRb 89.82 84.46 89.73 85.22 0.09 -0.76
DAVN EMSRb 87.9 85.01 87.95 85.63 -0.05 -0.62
SHBP EMSRb 87.25 85.31 87.17 85.93 0.08 -0.62
ProBP EMSRb 87.62 85.1 87.6 85.45 0.02 -0.35
Table 6-3 Average network load factors at all demand factors, for simulations with replanning
disutilities and base case
Discussions
Referring to Figure 4-3 and 4-4, the reader will recall that replanning disutility costs are
also high (along with PQI disutility costs), especially for business passengers in mid to
long haul markets. Hence it is expected that replanning disutilities have significant
impact among the three disutilities, which is proven by results shown in previous
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sections. With replanning disutility costs, the convenient scheduled paths (in general)
become more favorable to passengers, resulting in passengers being less willing to shift
to inconvenient paths. Therefore we can expect the demand for peak time paths to be
higher than the base case, and consequently, demand for off-peak time paths to be lower
than the base case. Due to these reasons O-D revenue management methods benefit more
when replanning disutility costs are implemented, as shown in Figures 6-9 to 6-12.
6.4. Summary
In this chapter, simulations with each of the three disutility components installed were
performed in order to observe the sensitivity of each disutility components. In Chapter 5
we observed that O-D revenue gains generally increased with all disutilities. However,
with each of the three disutilities, this is not always true. Among the three disutilities,
replanning disutility proves to have greatest impact on O-D revenue gain increases, as
expected from the estimated disutility functions. PQI disutility, with the highest disutility
costs, however, did not show as much influence on revenue gains of O-D revenue
management methods due to our network configuration. Simulation results with
unfavorite airline disutilities show interesting results with lower or similar revenue gains
than base case values, mainly due to the fact that FCYM revenue increase overrules O-D
benefits. Due to the reasons explained in Section 6.1.2, the whole system carried more
loads than the base case with unfavorite airline disutilities, and the relative gains in
revenues with O-D methods are less significant than the overall revenue and load factor
growth with unfavorite airline disutilities. In all of these simulations revenue
management methods with path-base forecasting (DAVN and ProBP) consistently proved
to be more effective, compared to other methods.
Average load factors generally tend to show small increases when accounting for
estimated disutility functions. However, with unfavorite airline disutility, relatively large
increase of load factors throughout the whole network, including airline B's load factors,
was observed. The reason for this increase is explained by the fact that without PQI
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disutilities, the demand for connecting local paths are higher than the base case due to
unfavorite airline disutility costs.
Figures 6-13 to 6-16 summarize the revenue gains of five O-D revenue management
methods for all simulations presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Five columns represent
revenue gains with all disutilities, PQI disutility, replanning disutility, unfavorite airline
disutility, and no disutilities (base case). Again it is shown that revenue gains for
replanning disutilities resemble the revenue gains with all disutilities, whereas revenue
gains with PQI disutilities are close to base case revenue gains.
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Figure 6-13 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, for all simulations, DF 0.8
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Figure 6-14 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, for all simulations DF 0.9
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Figure 6-15 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, for all simulations, DF 1.0
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Figure 6-16 Revenue gains over EMSRb vs. EMSRb, for all simulations, DF 1.1
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
7.1. Contribution of Thesis
The objective of this thesis was to develop an appropriate passenger disutility model for
airline revenue management simulations, and test the impact of passenger disutilities with
Passenger Origin Destination Simulator. The initial assumption for the passenger
disutility model was that there are four major components consisting of passenger
disutilities, restriction, unfavorite airline, path quality index, and replanning disutility. In
order to develop a general passenger disutility model, it is assumed that all disutility
components are defined with mean values, which is a function of market index fares. For
the disutility model of this thesis all disutility functions are assumed to be linear. Also, to
reflect the stochastic nature of individual passengers, disutility costs are assumed to be in
a Gaussian distribution form, with average values defined with disutility functions.
This thesis uses survey answers from 13 airline experts to estimate the coefficients of
each disutility components, for both business and leisure passengers. With mathematical
analogy the survey answers are interpreted into the average and standard deviation of
disutility distribution at a single market index fare level (which matches with market
distance in our case). With average disutility costs for four market index fare levels, a
simple linear regression gives the intercept and slope of each disutility functions with
very high statistical significance. The estimated disutility functions - unfavorite airline,
path quality index, and replanning disutility functions for both business and leisure
passengers - summarized in Section 4.3 are the product of the first part of this thesis.
The passenger disutility model developed from this thesis now allows us to perform
simulations with realistic representation of passengers' path choice patterns. Passenger
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choice is the fundamental element of all air transportation market responses; hence the
disutility model developed in this thesis can be used in various simulations and analysis
of air transportation systems. In this thesis we concentrated on testing revenue
management simulations with passenger disutilities applied.
When all of the major disutility functions defined in PODS were incorporated in the
simulation, it was shown in Chapter 5 that the relative revenue gains of O-D revenue
management methods were higher than without any disutilities. Existence of passenger
disutility costs means that passengers' path preferences for more convenient paths are
higher, resulting in higher demands for those paths and lower demands for inconvenient
paths. With concentrated demand on some of the attractive paths, the role of revenue
management becomes more important, leading to bigger difference in terms of revenues
between advanced O-D methods and FCYM approach. This is especially true at high
demand levels, where O-D methods are able to achieve more "optimal" fare mix than the
EMSRb algorithm with FCYM approach.
Among the three disutilities tested in this thesis, the impact of replanning disutility costs
had the biggest impact in our Network D. This was partly expected from the magnitude
of replanning disutility coefficients estimated from the survey. Even though the PQI
disutility function is generally larger than the replanning disutility function, the PQI
disutility had minimal impact since distinction between connecting and nonstop path was
limited to local markets only. The replanning disutility, on the other hand, is applied to all
paths offered in this network, since all markets are served three times a day. In
conclusion it was verified that the magnitude of disutility functions are the indicators of
its impact on the system, and also the impact very much depends on the network
configuration. The estimation from the survey implies that path quality followed by
replanning is the biggest factor in the air transportation system.
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7.2. Future Research Directions
Our attempt to represent passenger disutility is only a first step in understanding and
representing passenger behavior with an analytic model. Assumptions for our model -
disutility function as a linear function of market index fares, and Gaussian distribution of
disutility costs - seems reasonable for an initial approach, but there is always room for
more sophisticated representation and its investigation.
Besides the assumptions, there also is room for improvement in reliability of the
estimated disutility parameters. In this thesis the survey answers of thirteen airline
experts have been the basis for disutility function coefficients. If it is possible to gather
extensive data from actual airline PNR24 databases or passenger choice records from
electronic purchasing, it may be possible to take a step forward towards more realistic
passenger choice representation.
Apart from the modeling approach, there are some more issues on the simulation and
testing side that this thesis leaves for future research. With our Network D we have
observed that the replanning disutility costs is the one that is driving O-D method
performance over the system, due to both the magnitude of replanning disutility function
and Network configuration. In order to test comparable impacts of path quality
disutilities, a new network with wider choice between nonstop/connecting paths is
required. Therefore more complicated version of Network D, possibly with nonstop paths
provided in spoke to spoke markets, can better show the impact of PQI disutilities to a
certain extent. As for replanning disutilities, it would be interesting to see how the O-D
revenue gains along with market response changes with different set of banks and bank
timings. Also even though the impact of unfavorite airline disutilities are not as large as
the others, simulations with different airline preference factors may give clearer insight
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about the impact of airline preferences on the air transportation market and revenue
benefits of various revenue management methods.
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